F4E1 chunk-size bound (decrypt memory safety)
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Status: hardening for a decrypt-time OOM found by adversarial fuzzing. Applies to every runtime that restores an F4E1-encrypted archive — the legacy
Sandboxpath served bydevelopand the Sandbox 1.0 (v1-sandbox) track.
The issue
src/crypto/backup-encryption.ts decrypts chunk by chunk:
header (17B) | AES-256-GCM chunk | tag | AES-256-GCM chunk | tag | …
decryptStream buffers a full chunkSize + TAG_LENGTH before it can
authenticate and emit that chunk, and parseHeader used to accept any chunk size
up to 256 MiB. A corrupt or maliciously written object could therefore make
a restore try to buffer ~256 MiB in a single ArrayBuffer — far above the Workers
isolate memory limit — and the Worker is OOM-killed mid-restore, exactly when a
recovery archive must be readable. The legacy restore path reaches this code on
every encrypted recovery point:
src/crypto/r2-backup.ts#decryptBackupArchive→chunkSizeFromHeader+decryptStreamonbackups/<id>/data.sqsh.enc.src/persistence.tsusesdecryptBytesfor config versions (one chunk).
Fuzz finding: a 17-byte header advertising a 256 MiB chunk is enough to trigger it — no valid ciphertext body is needed.
The change
- New
MAX_CHUNK_SIZE(16 MiB) is enforced byparseHeader, sochunkSizeFromHeader/decryptStreamreject an out-of-range header from the header bytes alone, before any chunk is buffered. 16 MiB is four times the 4 MiB writer default and far below the isolate limit. encryptBytesclamps its single-chunk header toMAX_CHUNK_SIZE, so the single-shot writer (config versions, secrets) can never emit a header a reader would reject.
Existing objects are unaffected: the writer default (4 MiB) and every
encryptBytes payload small enough to be one chunk are inside the bound. An
object written with a header above 16 MiB is already unreadable in practice
(that is the OOM case) and now fails fast instead.
Verification
src/crypto/backup-encryption.test.ts— default and maximum accepted;0andMAX_CHUNK_SIZE + 1rejected; the historic 256 MiB header rejected from the header alone;encryptBytesclamps and still round-trips aMAX_CHUNK_SIZE + 1payload.- Seeded fuzz harness (
bun run --cwd apps/fouria test:fuzz:sandbox-v1 [iterations] [seed]): round-trip, length invariants, single-byte corruption, wrong key, mid-chunk truncation, and the header bound across thousands of random shapes.
Known limitation (unchanged)
F4E1 authenticates each chunk but does not commit to a total plaintext length, so
truncating a multi-chunk ciphertext exactly on a chunk boundary decrypts to a
shorter plaintext without an authentication error. On the legacy path the
squashfs restore and its size/integrity validation are the only guard; the
Sandbox 1.0 DirectoryBackup path additionally checks record.size before the
SDK restore. A future format version should authenticate a total length/EOF
marker.