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2026.10.29

Features

  • fouria: expose gateway RSS and add a dev-gated memory watchdog (#526) (441fdae)
  • fouria,moltlazy: reconcile declared software on demand and report its real state (#525) (5476899)
  • fouria: renew durable snapshot leases (#512) (5a38cd5)
  • fouria-dispatch,fouria: scale fleet fan-out and make catalog writes conflict-safe (#510) (c4ef484)
  • fouria: checkpoint durable tenant jobs and harden the backup step budget (#509) (2114c1f)
  • lerma,fouria: price semantic billing actions with trace precedence (#507) (85f8701)

Bug fixes

  • lerma: make dispatch deploys idempotent around migrated DO classes (#516) (#520) (d3c2f60)
  • fouria: stop the idle-sleep snapshot loop and reconcile dev heartbeats (#518) (9b324bc)
  • fouria: make backup catalog reads pure and healing explicit (#511) (7470376)
  • fouria: keep environment repair available while the gateway is down (#506) (1321226)
  • fouria: defer repairs until the restored gateway is up (#505) (579532b)

Chores

  • openclaw: migrate to 2026.10.8 (#524) (66a46da)
  • openclaw: migrate to 2026.10.6 (#515) (0df3522)

2026.10.21

Features

  • website: add FourIA Terms of Service page (#499) (892282c)
  • observability: ingest Cloudflare OTLP destinations + uptime stats (#337) (#478) (1a4630b)
  • fouria,lerma: backup before container deprovisioning (#456) (54ef3f6)
  • fouria: Telegram webhook ingress with cold-start message queue (#364) (#449) (b95acd8)
  • fouria,moltlazy: declarative software provisioning for agent skills (#459) (a7b623b)
  • fouria: dev→production agent push (promotion) + local two-worker E2E (#453) (3dc5863)

Bug fixes

  • fouria: defer request-scoped restores and stop only on inactivity (#503) (7171192)
  • observability: decompress gzip OTLP destination batches (#337) (#484) (7bd792b)
  • gateway: soft reload targets the server and keeps OPENCLAW_NO_RESPAWN (#463) (#477) (a883054)
  • fouria: durable maintenance jobs over WebSocket, release promotion, homepage crash (#468) (90680ba)
  • fouria: run SQLite integrity + doctor repair as durable jobs (#467) (f841ac4)
  • fouria,moltlazy: mitigate dev sandbox memory OOM (#462) (132355e)

Tests

  • expand auth backup and billing coverage (#471) (43a8b18)
  • e2e: drop cctr-incompatible ‘#’ corpus headers and add a guard (cc95f96)

Chores

  • observability: enable production destination export (#337) (#486) (98078dc)
  • release: adopt Changesets for semver versions and changelogs (#483) (67a91ed)
  • openclaw: migrate to 2026.10.5 (#476) (9991907)
  • deps: bump the bun-all group across 1 directory with 56 updates (#474) (471ddad)
  • fouria: pin cctr to the 0xCAB0/cctr fork (0.31.0-paso4.1) (9b5ea28)
  • fouria: enable software provisioning on staging via MOLTLAZY_FEATURE_FLAGS (#464) (dd3c417)

Other changes

  • Feature/dev instances can emit billable (#502) (d8bc76d)
  • Feature/enhance fouria builder (#501) (95a1107)
  • Feature/migrate dev to vite plugin (#475) (a8cad6f)
  • Fixed healtz quick endpoint (7e76734)
  • Moved components snapshot from Healthcheck endpoints (b2d9679)

Historical changes (imported from apps/fouria/AGENTS.md)

These entries predate the generated release sections above. They were maintained by hand in apps/fouria/AGENTS.md and are kept here verbatim for traceability. New entries belong in a changeset (see docs/VERSIONING.md); the sections above are generated by scripts/release.mjs.

  • Adversarial/fuzz pass on the Sandbox v1 critical pipelines closed six defects. A second attack run against zero data loss, secrets, memory and boot found: (1) v1CreateSnapshot could race an operator restore (it only checked container liveness; the worker’s maintenance window covers route-driven calls but not the primitive) — it now returns skipped: 'restoring', so a half-swapped directory can never become the recovery point. (2) startGatewayOwner re-checks #restoring before the launch and inside the readiness loop, so a boot that overlaps a restore aborts retryably instead of launching over the swap or reporting readiness for a gateway the restore is about to kill. (3) v1ProcessOutput decoded whatever a process wrote after the SDK had buffered it in the DO isolate — reads are now truncated at MAX_PROCESS_OUTPUT_BYTES (1 MiB per stream) with truncated: true. (4) A start-openclaw.sh start wrapper that exits 0 (lost startup lock) with no gateway process anywhere waited the whole timeoutMs (up to 5 min); after SANDBOX_V1_ZERO_EXIT_GRACE_MS (default 15s, 0 disables) the DO proves the absence of an owner (pgrep -f on the setup wrapper or the gateway) and fails fast, while a booting lock winner resets the grace and is adopted. (5) A failed conversion left the streamed squashfs and the partial extraction in /tmp (~2× the archive on a 4–12 GB disk), so retries could ENOSPC the container: failures now clean up best-effort and rethrow the original error. (6) The durable migration:convert-status and its log stored error.message verbatim; redactSecrets (known env values ≥ 8 chars, longest-first) scrubs both before they are written. Tests: src/sandbox-v1-adversarial.test.ts (restore/snapshot overlap, restore retry + in-progress refusal, 12-snapshot → 24-restore → boot round-trip fuzz, R2 secret scan, redacted conversion failure, output cap, zero-exit fast-fail / live-peer adoption), src/sandbox-migration/conversion.test.ts (scratch cleanup, cleanup failure never masks the original error), src/logging.test.ts (redactSecrets, 60 fuzz-embedded credentials, envSecretValues); fuzz harness bun run --cwd apps/fouria test:fuzz:sandbox-v1 -- 4000 (all invariants held); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/plans/sandbox-v1-adversarial-fuzz.md, docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md.
  • Sandbox v1 presents gateway traffic as direct-remote when the Gateway refuses proxy attribution (proxy_attribution_required). Every dev instance deployed on the v1 runtime served {"error":{"type":"proxy_attribution_required"}} on the root HTML/WS proxy (and the admin-RPC reads fell back to the CLI): OpenClaw attributes proxy-shaped traffic (any Forwarded / X-Forwarded-* / X-Real-IP) against gateway.trustedProxies before Gateway auth and rejects a source it cannot trust, and moltlazy’s heal can only list the ranges the legacy runtime reaches the container from (the Cloudflare Sandbox bridge, 10.1.0.x). The v1 transport forwards through ctx.container.getTcpPort(port) from the SandboxV1 Durable Object, whose ingress address is owned by the platform — not an address any tenant config can know (and blindly unioning more private ranges is unsafe: a range that swallows the X-Forwarded-For walk makes attribution worse). A direct-remote request, by contrast, is always attributed and is served with the same token/device auth, so SandboxV1.fetch() now probes attribution once per gateway incarnation (GET / with the rebuilt forwarded headers — exactly the Gateway-authenticated route that fails) and, when the Gateway refuses it, strips every proxy-shaped header before forwarding. The verdict is cached for the DO lifetime and re-probed after v1KillGateway / v1Destroy / startGatewayOwner, so a healed gateway.trustedProxies restores client-IP (rate-limit/audit attribution) fidelity without a Worker deploy; requests with no forwarded headers skip the probe, and a probe that cannot reach a booting Gateway leaves the mode unknown (traffic keeps its headers) and is retried. src/gateway/proxy-attribution.ts owns the header set and the payload classifier (403 + type/message) so the proxy, the admin-RPC path and the transport cannot drift. Structured event: sandbox.v1.proxy_attribution.direct (warn). Tests: src/gateway/proxy-attribution.test.ts, src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (gateway proxy attribution: direct fallback, cached verdict, accepted attribution keeps headers, failed probe never degrades traffic, no probe without forwarded headers, re-probe after destroy); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § “Sandbox v1 gateway proxy attribution”, packages/moltlazy/AGENTS.md.
  • Sandbox v1 waking/sleep policy and automation wake are lifecycle-correct (audit follow-up). Four gaps between the legacy policy and SDK 1.0’s durable_object lifecycle are closed. (1) Production keep-alive is real: resolveInactivityPolicy() now returns the 6h maximum + keepAlive: true for billable production instead of null — with no timeout the platform stops the container shortly after the DO goes inactive, so the old “never sleeps” contract was the opposite of what it claimed. A keep-alive purpose (sandbox-v1:keepalive-pending) shares the DO alarm slot, re-applies the timeout and re-arms at timeout/2; the cadence and a queued conversion keep their own markers, and clearing one purpose never deletes another’s alarm. (2) Wake keeps the provisioned size: startContainer() reads CONTAINER_INSTANCE_TYPE (allowlist, fallback standard-1); lerma deploys it from the instance type. (3) No empty recovery point: v1CreateSnapshot skips a stopped container ({ state: 'skipped', reason: 'not-running' }) instead of calling ensureRunning() and archiving an empty /home/openclaw; /control freeze/backup/checkpoint, /debug/* and the scheduler’s snapshot job report the skip. (4) Reliable automation wake: the occurrence guard (wokenFor) survives mirror writes and resets only when the next run advances; a woken occurrence that does not advance backs off 5m→30m instead of re-waking every 60s, and a failed wake/read keeps the schedule with a bounded retry instead of deleting it. The durable boot job mirrors the schedule right after launchRestoredState (no dashboard poll needed); on v1 the wake enqueues that boot job (deduped) and returns { ready: false } instead of blocking the alarm turn on a restore + launch, so no CLI read runs against a booting container (legacy keeps the fast waitForReady:false path). Activity re-arms go through the shared combined alarm, and the alarm’s memory watch is gated on isRuntimeActive() so a diagnostic never starts a stopped v1 instance. The task buffer and Telegram ingress queue resolve resolveRuntimeIntent() before acquiring a sandbox (they defaulted to legacy on a converted tenant). Operators get a non-waking GET /debug/lifecycle (policy + keepAliveArmedAt/snapshotCadenceArmedAt/stableRecordId) and POST /api/admin/activity/refresh (mirror the CLI schedule deterministically). The live drill apps/fouria/test/e2e-v1/03_passive_health_and_wake.txt (bun run --cwd apps/fouria test:e2e:v1:live, skip unless E2E_V1_LIVE=1) covers idle stop → automation wake, freeze/backup on the sleeping tenant, and billable keep-alive on a temporary billable binding. Tests: src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (keep-alive, instance type, stopped-snapshot skip, lifecycle), src/activity/{alarm,scheduler}.test.ts (occurrence guard/backoff, no give-up, boot mirror, durable v1 wake, non-waking memory watch), src/index.test.ts (freeze/backup skip on a stopped v1 tenant), src/routes/api/activity.test.ts, src/tasks/index.test.ts (v1 wake), src/telegram-ingress/queue.test.ts (explicit runtime); lerma tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs; docs WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, ENV-VARIABLES.md, sandbox-v1-scaffold.md, TESTING.md, test/e2e-v1/README.md.
  • A tenant can be provisioned directly on the Sandbox v1 runtime (“born v1”), with no conversion. Until now the only path to v1 was migrate, so a brand-new instance always started legacy. A fresh tenant is now identified by a durable marker written by Lerma at provisioning (sandbox-migration/<canonical-slug>/runtime.json in BACKUP_BUCKET: { version: 1, tenant, runtime: "v1", mode: "fresh", provisionedAt }, create-only before the script deploy; the Worker only reads it). src/sandbox-migration/runtime-marker.ts owns the contract: runtimeMarkerKey, a strict validator (version 1, runtime: v1, mode: fresh, a tenant matching the scope it was read from, an ISO 8601 timestamp with an explicit zone), tri-state readRuntimeMarker(bucket, scope) via the shared readJsonObject, and readFreshRuntime(env) for the routes (no bucket ⇒ absent, unresolved identity ⇒ unknown). resolveRuntimeIntent resolves absent intent + present marker → v1; unknown marker → unknown; absent marker with SANDBOX_RUNTIME=v1 → pending (fail closed: the instance asked for v1 but was never provisioned for it, so it must never boot the legacy container and create legacy state); otherwise legacy. The conversion intent still wins over a marker (the C8 record+pointer barrier decides when a converted tenant serves). /control migrate on a fresh tenant answers 409 MIGRATION_ALREADY_V1 (“there is nothing to convert”) without addressing the DO or enqueuing (an unreadable marker → 503 SANDBOX_V1_RUNTIME_UNKNOWN, since converting a tenant that may already be v1 is destructive), and migration-status answers 200 { state: 'absent', mode: 'fresh' } without touching the DO (a converted tenant reports mode: 'converted'). restoreTenantStateIfNeeded() returns false for a pointer-less, record-less container so the tenant onboards in the v1 container with OPENCLAW_RESTORED unset, and the first recovery point is taken right after that first successful boot: v1EnsureGateway dispatches runInitialSnapshot() detached (ctx.waitUntil, never awaited, so readiness is not delayed), only when verifyRecoveryPoint is pointer-absent and conversion.json is absent — a converted tenant, a tenant that already snapshotted (cadence/backup/checkpoint-park), an unreadable/inconsistent pointer and a parked tenant are left alone, and a stopped container is never woken. A single-flight promise folds concurrent boots (owner run + adopted-gateway path) into one attempt, a settled flag keeps the adopting boot path at one R2 read per incarnation, and takeOwnedSnapshot() gives the cadence and this attempt one shared owner so they cannot snapshot the directory concurrently (the loser skips; the cadence keeps its alarm). Failures are caught and logged as sandbox.v1.initial_snapshot_failed with the boot still ready, and retried on a later boot (a new DO incarnation immediately, the same one after INITIAL_SNAPSHOT_RETRY_MS = 10 min); success logs sandbox.v1.initial_snapshot. The committed DirectoryBackup + stable.json pointer becomes the recovery point for park/restore/boot (retention applies; the cadence stays the backstop for the few seconds between readiness and the archive committing). Policy is unchanged: the matrix returns legacy outside WORKER_PLATFORM === "staging", and the reserved client slug is never provisioned with a marker (the Worker treats a marker as authoritative for serving). Tests: src/sandbox-migration/runtime-marker.test.ts, src/sandbox-migration/intent-gate.test.ts (full matrix), src/index.test.ts (fresh serving, 409, absent+fresh, pending without a marker, unreadable marker), src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (fresh onboarding without OPENCLAW_RESTORED; first recovery point committed after the boot, once under concurrent boots, a failed attempt tolerated + retried on a later boot, and skipped for a converted tenant with a complete pointer or a parked tenant); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-cutover.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § “Provisioning an instance directly on Sandbox v1”, docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md.
  • The ROOT debug tools work on Sandbox v1. /debug/* (DEBUG_ROUTES=true, ROOT) runs against whatever client the request acquired, so on a converted tenant every route that touched the container was audited against V1SandboxClient and fixed where the legacy call has no v1 equivalent. A shared readFinishedProcessLogs() tries the legacy logs() stream and falls back to output() (the v1 handle has no replayable log stream), so /processes?logs=true and /logs?id= report a finished process’s stdout instead of Failed to retrieve logs; the gateway log routes tail /tmp/gateway-stdout.log and now return path + runtime. /restart-openclaw gained a v1 branch (maintenance window → killGateway → resetStartupCache/clearPersistenceCache/resetV1GatewayStart, no legacy checkpoint and no restore-needed — a v1 restart destroys nothing); /reprovision checkpoints with v1CreateSnapshot and treats a restorable copy as the C8 verifyRecoveryPoint (not backups/<id>/meta.json), returning recordId; /backup/:mode snapshots through the DO and never boots a gateway on v1; /destroy-container also clears the startup cache and the isolate start dedupe; /env reports sandbox_runtime_actual. One refusal: /debug/sleep answers 503 { code: 'SANDBOX_V1_SLEEP_UNSUPPORTED' } because v1 has no stop primitive (the tenant sleeps on the platform inactivity timer) — a 202 would claim work that never happens. One caveat: /rescue-container diagnoses/destroys, but v1 containerFetch never wakes a stopped container, so a sleeping tenant reads as unreachable. Process ids are per DO incarnation (empty list after an eviction → use /debug/gateway-logs). Tests: routes/debug.test.ts (Sandbox v1 (converted tenant) debug routes, 15 cases with a __fouriaSandboxV1-branded double) plus the dashboard card test; corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-serving.txt; compatibility matrix in docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § “Debug tools on Sandbox v1 (ROOT diagnostics)”, QA drill in docs/plans/sandbox-v1-migration-report.md § 10.
  • Sandbox v1 idle snapshot cadence (PER-2). A converted tenant’s container is owned by SandboxV1, and raw ctx.container has no eviction hook (the legacy onActivityExpired → archive → stop path does not exist on SDK 1.0), so the platform’s inactivity stop silently dropped everything written since the last committed record. The DO now runs its own cadence: startContainer() arms a durable purpose marker (snapshot:cadence-pending) plus ctx.storage.setAlarm (never postponing an earlier alarm, so a queued conversion keeps its slot), alarm() runs runConversionAlarm() then runSnapshotCadence(), and v1Destroy() clears both (unless a conversion is queued). resolveSnapshotIntervalMs(env, inactivityTimeoutMs) resolves SANDBOX_V1_SNAPSHOT_INTERVAL_MS (ms, 0 disables) → else the configured BACKUP_INTERVAL_MINUTES → else 1h, capped at half the inactivity timeout (staging 7.5m, dev 1h), so it never fires after the container would have slept. The turn never wakes a stopped container, skips while #restoring, skips when the recovery point (stable.json) is newer than the interval (deduping with the ActivityScheduler’s interval-gated v1 snapshot), then calls v1CreateSnapshot({ trigger: 'backup' }) and re-arms; failures log sandbox.v1.snapshot.cadence_failed/cadence_arm_failed and never throw. selectRecordsToPrune now breaks a same-millisecond createdAt tie by record id, so retention is deterministic for back-to-back snapshots. Tests: src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (arm, disable, fire + re-arm, dedupe, never-wake, destroy), src/sandbox-migration/records.test.ts (tie-break); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-persistence.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 idle snapshot cadence), docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md.
  • Sandbox v1 restore by record id (PER-2). POST /api/admin/storage/restore/:id on a converted tenant no longer falls into the legacy .sqsh path: the route opens the durable maintenance window (restore) first (the v1 ensureGateway branch honors it, so a request cannot restart the gateway under the swap), then SandboxV1.v1RestoreRecord stops the single gateway owner, restores the catalogued record’s directory into HOME_DIR (SDK atomic swap), and by default advances the stable pointer so a cold boot restores the chosen record (?setCurrent=0 applies without promoting). An unknown/unreadable record fails closed (404) without touching the container, a restore already in progress is refused by an in-DO flag, and the Worker then boots the restored state and reports gatewayReady (a boot failure never undoes the restore). v1 restores are synchronous — there is no legacy job queue for the record format. Tests: src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (restore + promote, no-promote, unknown record), src/routes/api/storage.test.ts (v1 branch, 404, maintenance window), src/gateway/process.test.ts (maintenance guard); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-persistence.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 restore by record id).
  • Sandbox v1 outbound virtual hosts (OCM-1 / BIL-1). A converted tenant could not reach the Worker-owned virtual hosts: TenantSandbox.outboundByHost is a static on the legacy Sandbox class, and SDK 1.0 has no such statics, so SandboxV1’s container had no intercept for otel.internal (OTLP export / AI cost attribution), the *.r2.internal bridges (leads/docs/software) or cdp.internal (Browser Rendering via the container’s local CDP proxy). The host map now lives in src/sandbox-outbound.ts (SANDBOX_OUTBOUND_ROUTES), used by both runtimes: the legacy class installs it as its outboundByHost statics, and SandboxV1.startContainer() registers every host with ctx.container.interceptOutboundHttp(host, ctx.exports.SandboxOutboundGateway({ props: { host } })). Intercepts belong to the container instance, so they are re-registered on every start (including a restarted DO that finds the container running); a bundle without the export warns and keeps direct egress instead of failing the boot. Each intercepted request is dispatched by host to the existing bridge handler; an unknown host answers a structured 404 rather than throwing (an escaping exception surfaces in the container as ECONNRESET). Tests: src/sandbox-outbound.test.ts, src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (one intercept per host, re-registered on restart, missing export warns); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-serving.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 outbound virtual hosts).
  • Sandbox v1 rollout park (SEC-3). A converted tenant can be parked for a container replacement. /control checkpoint-park on v1 drains live sessions to read-only (over the v1 gateway WS bridge, recording the previous modes durably), commits the recovery point with v1CreateSnapshot fail-closed (502 SANDBOX_V1_PARK_SNAPSHOT_FAILED, so no rollout starts without a restorable copy), and only then opens the durable park (maintenance/replacement.json { parked: true }) and arms the exec lock; a stopped container is already parked (skipped: 'not-running'). The existing guards block writes (tenantParkGuard → 409 TENANT_PARKED, /control refuses every action except resume/checkpoint-park, assertTenantExecAllowed), reads stay available. resume clears the park, unlocks exec, boots through the v1 DO and applies the recorded session modes after a real /health probe (or reports sessionModes: "pending"); resuming an unparked tenant never wakes it. killGateway stays process-scoped on v1. Tests: src/index.test.ts (park → 409 + durable record, resume, unparked no-op); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-cutover.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 rollout park).
  • Sandbox v1 boot, owner and repair (OCM-2). The durable lanes that run outside a request now resolve the tenant’s runtime themselves. ActivityScheduler.sandbox() is async and calls resolveRuntimeIntent before acquireSandbox(..., runtime); a pending/unknown tenant is skipped (activity.sandbox.skipped) instead of being acted on. Previously the scheduler always acquired the legacy client, so after a conversion an alarm-driven wake or a scheduled snapshot would have booted the old container, archived the legacy filesystem and advanced the legacy stable-backup.json — silent divergence from the v1 recovery point. A snapshot backup job on a converted tenant now calls SandboxV1.createSnapshot({ trigger: 'backup' }) (DirectoryBackup + catalog + pointer + retention) instead of the legacy stage/archive/finalize pipeline; v1 restore/deprovision jobs report skipped with an explicit reason. The DO’s startGatewayOwner mirrors the legacy boot guards: it races the supervised launch’s exit against the /health poll (a non-zero exit before the port opens fails in seconds; a zero exit is ignored as the lost-race path), tails /tmp/gateway-stdout.log, and queues the durable doctor-repair (gateway-launch-state-database) with a retryable error when the log matches a SQLite corruption signature. Tests: src/activity/scheduler.test.ts (v1 acquisition, v1 scheduled snapshot), src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (early exit fails fast, corrupt DB queues the repair); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-cutover.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 boot, owner and repair).
  • Sandbox v1 snapshots and the recovery point (PER-2). A converted tenant now has a v1 persistence path of its own. src/sandbox-migration/records.ts is the catalog: records/<id>.json per committed DirectoryBackup entry plus the shared stable.json pointer, with verifyRecoveryPoint as the single C8 read (pointer→record: pointer-absent, record-absent, record-unknown, pointer-record-mismatch, or complete). SandboxV1.v1CreateSnapshot() writes the record through backupDirectory (post-encrypted in place with F4E1, failing closed on BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_REQUIRED), catalogs it immediately, advances the pointer, and prunes oldest-first beyond BACKUP_MAX_VERSIONS (default 3) while protecting the record just taken; a failed snapshot never stops the container. /control backup/checkpoint on a v1 tenant are served by the DO (SANDBOX_V1_SNAPSHOT_FAILED on error) and never enter the legacy .sqsh orchestration; other control actions still answer 503 SANDBOX_V1_CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED. Cold boot restores what the pointer names (falling back to conversion.json for pre-catalog records) and refuses a conversion record without a pointer instead of onboarding over converted state. Tests: src/sandbox-migration/records.test.ts, src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (snapshot + prune, pointer restore, pointerless refusal), src/index.test.ts (/control v1 snapshot); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-persistence.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 snapshots and the recovery point).
  • Sandbox v1 conversion orchestration (S5 / PER-3). /control with X-FourIA-Control: migrate starts the legacy → v1 conversion, and the Dispatch Worker forwards migrate (CONTROL_ACTIONS). The entry is queue-only: it calls v1RequestConversion() on the SandboxV1 DO and answers immediately — the conversion streams the legacy squashfs, extracts it in the v1 container and uploads a DirectoryBackup, which is minutes of work that no Worker request can survive. The contract is 202 { state: 'queued' | 'running' }, 200 { state: 'committed', recordId }, 502 { state: 'failed', error, code: 'SANDBOX_V1_CONVERSION_FAILED' } for a durably recorded failure, and 503 SANDBOX_V1_UNAVAILABLE when the binding is missing or the DO is unreachable (nothing recorded → safe to retry); the staging/reserved-slug gate (403/409) still runs in middleware before any DO access and the route logs sandbox.v1.conversion.requested. The conversion runs on the DO alarm(): conversion first, cadence second, each wrapped so one cannot starve the other, and the gateway is launched afterwards with OPENCLAW_RESTORED=true. The job is durable (migration:convert-request marker + migration:convert-status, with a 1-based attempt) and idempotent (committed via DO state or the R2 record, queued/running in flight, new work only from absent/failed); alarm() orders running → committed before dropping the marker and before the launch, so a launch failure never retracts the commit, and a failure records failed with a bounded message instead of throwing. A lost alarm self-heals: v1ConversionState()/v1RequestConversion()/v1Status()/v1EnsureGateway() call ensureConversionArmed(), which re-arms only a non-terminal job and never wakes the container; armConversionAlarm() never postpones an earlier pending alarm (the cadence shares the slot, so conversion arming wins); #conversionRun is the single owner so overlapping alarm turns cannot start a second destructive conversion. migrate is an idempotent enqueue (it starts work from absent/failed), so polling reuses a separate read-only action, migration-status (X-FourIA-Control: migration-status; dispatch CONTROL_ACTIONS + echo of state/recordId, no snapshot CPU budget, no tenant-cache invalidation): it calls only v1ConversionState() — never v1RequestConversion() — so it cannot enqueue, start work or wake the container, and answers 200 { state: absent | queued | running | committed | failed, recordId?, error? } (absent for a legacy tenant without addressing a v1 DO; 503 SANDBOX_V1_UNAVAILABLE when the binding is missing or the read fails), never 202. There is no synchronous conversion entry point — v1ConvertNow was removed from the DO, the RPC surface and V1SandboxClient. Tests: src/sandbox-v1.test.ts (queue/arm, alarm commit, cadence-after-conversion, failed recording, new attempt from failed, overlapping alarms, re-arm after a DO restart, no re-queue), src/index.test.ts (202 queued/running, 200 committed, 502 failed, 503 unreachable/binding, no inline conversion, converted-tenant migrate), src/sandbox-v1-client.test.ts (no inline method), workers/fouria-dispatch/test/unit/control.test.ts (status forwarding + echo); corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-cutover.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 conversion orchestration), docs/plans/sandbox-v1-migration-report.md (drill 12), docs/plans/sandbox-v1-scaffold.md.
  • Sandbox v1 serving parity (S3 / OCM-1). A converted tenant is now served by SandboxV1 instead of failing closed. src/sandbox-v1-client.ts adds V1SandboxClient (a Sandbox-shaped client over the SandboxV1 DO) with HTTP/WS transport (stub.fetch → ctx.container.getTcpPort(port).fetch, never waking a stopped container; 503 SANDBOX_V1_SLEEPING), isRuntimeActive/status, a process RPC shim (exec/getProcess/listProcesses + output/waitForExit/kill), killGateway and destroy; unsupported legacy operations throw SandboxV1UnsupportedOperationError with SANDBOX_V1_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION. acquireSandbox(env, id, options, runtime) selects legacy/v1 from the durable intent and fails closed on unknown; index.ts acquires the v1 client for a converted tenant and returns 503 SANDBOX_V1_CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED for /control actions until S4. ensureGateway delegates to the DO (v1EnsureGateway), which adopts a healthy gateway, restores the committed v1 DirectoryBackup into an empty container (OPENCLAW_RESTORED=true), and runs start-openclaw.sh start as the single owner; killGateway delegates to v1KillGateway. getHealthSnapshot has v1 parity (non-waking sleeping, real /health readiness, 503-until-ready). Tests: src/sandbox-v1-client.test.ts, src/sandbox-v1.test.ts, src/gateway/health-probes.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts, src/sandbox-contract.test.ts, src/index.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-serving.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Sandbox v1 serving), docs/plans/sandbox-v1-scaffold.md.
  • Sandbox v1 conversion (S2). The v1 DO now owns the legacy→v1 data migration and the conversion barrier. src/sandbox-migration/state.ts is a tri-state reader (absent/present/unknown; only explicit absent permits legacy), intent.ts writes the per-tenant write-ahead intent, and lease.ts is a per-tenant R2 lease (create-only acquire, etag-CAS takeover, owner-scoped renew/release, fail-closed parse, TTL is liveness only). SandboxV1.convertToV1() acquires the lease, writes/validates the intent, opens the legacy recovery point (stable-backup.json, F4E1-decrypting data.sqsh.enc), streams the squashfs into the v1 container, extracts it with unsquashfs -f -d /home/openclaw, takes a v1 DirectoryBackup, writes sandbox-migration/<tenant>/conversion.json + stable.json, and verifies the pointer/record barrier (C8). The Worker refuses legacy routing/serving with 503 SANDBOX_V1_RUNTIME_PENDING and ensureGateway throws SandboxV1RuntimePendingError once the intent is present/unreadable (C5). Dockerfile.v1 installs squashfs-tools; the v1 serving path/readiness is S3 and durable job orchestration is S5. Tests: src/sandbox-migration/{state,intent,lease,conversion,intent-gate}.test.ts, src/index.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-persistence.txt; docs docs/plans/sandbox-v1-scaffold.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Sandbox v1 release tooling and deploy surface restored. The v1-sandbox track now carries the P5b release tooling (scripts/release-manifest.mjs, release-registry-digest.mjs, validate-runtime-image-pins.mjs + tests), Dockerfile.v1 copies sandbox-shim from cloudflare/sandbox:1.0.3 (matching catalog.@cloudflare/sandbox), and wrangler.jsonc restores the SandboxV1 durable_object container application (fouria-sandbox-v1 local/production, fouria-sandbox-v1-staging staging) plus the SandboxV1 DO binding in all three environments. bun scripts/validate-runtime-image-pins.mjs passes (3 v1 apps, 3 legacy apps). This is a deliberate reversal of audit finding F9 for the migration track only: the v1 image must be buildable/publishable for the staging lane, but no route selects SandboxV1 and no tenant is converted. Tests: scripts/*.test.ts; docs docs/plans/sandbox-v1-scaffold.md.
  • Sandbox v1 migration gate (S1). The cutover now has its authority and identity gate. src/sandbox-migration/platform.ts exposes the single canMigrate(env) predicate (true only for the trusted WORKER_PLATFORM === "staging" binding) and migrationRefusal(env), which resolves the canonical tenant with tenantSlugFromEnv and refuses null/default and the reserved client slug. The /control entry runs the gate in a middleware before the sandbox stub is acquired, so a refused X-FourIA-Control: migrate performs no R2 write and no DO/container addressing (403 MIGRATION_PLATFORM_FORBIDDEN, 409 MIGRATION_SLUG_UNRESOLVED, 409 MIGRATION_RESERVED_CLIENT); an allowed staging request stops at 501 MIGRATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED until S2 adds convertToV1. The gate is migrate-only, so freeze/unfreeze/backup/checkpoint/resume keep their behavior on every platform and on client. sanitizeCustomerSlug now rejects the default sentinel in every resolver branch (C10), and Lerma provisions WORKER_PLATFORM (from cf_environment) plus SANDBOX_V1_CUTOVER=false. Tests: src/sandbox-migration/platform.test.ts, src/sandbox-tenant.test.ts, src/index.test.ts (sandbox v1 migration gate), corpus test/business-rules/sandbox-v1-cutover.txt, Lerma tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs; docs docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§2.6).
  • Local containers no longer look like a platform bug, and the memory watchdog never races a boot. A local restore failed with Container failed to start while docker ps showed only a …-proxy sidecar churning every ~20 s; the app container was never created. That is net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark=1 (which Tailscale sets) making workerd’s egress sidecar drop its own marked handshake (cloudflare/workerd#6860), not a FourIA defect. The dev server now warns before it builds images — src/dev-container-preflight.ts (pure describeContainerNetnsProblem + readContainerNetnsSettings, unit-tested) reads the two relevant sysctls and prints the fix (preferred: net.core.devconf_inherit_init_net = 2, which keeps Tailscale working; one-session alternative: src_valid_mark=0) plus the stale-sidecar cleanup; FOURIA_SKIP_CONTAINER_PREFLIGHT=1 silences it for CI hosts. The same investigation exposed a real race: the durable memory watch sampled /proc with sandbox.exec — which auto-starts a stopped container — while a restore was probing it, producing gateway.memory-read failed (launch-failed) and a workerd jsgInternalError that aborted container.start(). checkGatewayMemoryHealth() now takes the bounded non-waking isRuntimeActive() read first and returns { action: 'skipped', reason: 'runtime-inactive' } when the runtime is off, and ActivityScheduler.runMemoryWatch() returns before sampling while a boot/backup/maintenance job is active (queued/running/retrying), so observability never participates in a boot. The persistence lease acquire is now bounded too: a conditional backup-lock write that never settles is reported as persistence.lock.write-timeout and treated as a lost acquire, instead of holding the durable step (6 min of silence, then job-step.interrupted) — observed locally when taking over an expired lease. Tests: src/dev-container-preflight.test.ts, src/gateway/memory.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/persistence.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/DEVELOPMENT.md § “Local containers never start”, docs/TESTING.md § “E2E Tests (Local)”, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § memory watchdog.
  • The loading page’s terminal shows the formatted durable job status instead of an empty /tmp/startup.log. /tmp/startup.log does not exist during the durable boot job’s restore phase (no start-openclaw.sh process yet) and can stay quiet while the gateway binds its port, so the terminal sat blank next to Still working on "Starting OpenClaw Gateway" (188s) — exactly when an operator wanted to know what the platform was doing. src/activity/job-status-log.ts (pure, unit-tested) formats the state the Worker already reads into jobLog lines: the ActivityScheduler boot job (Boot running — launching the gateway (step 2/2, attempt 1/3), 4m in this step), the restore-progress record (Restore — Decrypting the backup (32%), with the existing idle/terminal annotations), and an active repair (Repair running — openclaw doctor --fix, attempt 1/3), including a retry wait and a truncated failure reason. /api/startup/ws pushes jobLog on every frame and the non-passive not-yet-ready /api/health / /api/health-snapshot carries it (plus boot/repair) for the HTTP polling fallback. loading.html renders the container log when it has content and otherwise the job log, labels the terminal source (/tmp/startup.log vs boot job status), and keeps the terminal visible during the whole restore phase — the brand logo now only appears when there is nothing at all to show. Tests: src/activity/job-status-log.test.ts, src/assets/loading.test.ts, src/routes/public.test.ts; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § Startup Progress.
  • The agent browser reaches Cloudflare Browser Rendering through a private cdp.internal bridge, with no Cloudflare Access bypass. The tenant /cdp route is behind the host Access application (302), so it is no longer the agent transport. The container runs cdp-proxy.mjs (127.0.0.1:9223), a WS↔HTTP proxy that serves CDP discovery and forwards commands to the Worker’s cdp.internal handler (TenantSandbox.outboundByHost). The handler calls the tenant’s Sandbox Durable Object (cdpCommand/cdpClose), which launches the browser from env.BROWSER and keeps the session across OpenClaw’s per-action WebSockets (serialized command queue). src/cdp-session.ts reuses the /cdp handleCDPMethod, so the transports cannot drift; the Browser Rendering credential never enters the container. Moltlazy writes a fill-only remote-CDP profile (browser.profiles.cloudflare.cdpUrl=http://127.0.0.1:9223, defaultProfile=cloudflare) and adds tools.alsoAllow: ["browser"] (the coding profile excludes it); restored boots re-apply --only gateway,browser. Tests: src/cdp-session.test.ts, src/sandbox-cdp-bridge.test.ts, src/index.test.ts (host registration/health), packages/moltlazy/tests/config/browser.test.ts, tests/config/tools.test.ts, E2E test/e2e/r_browser_remote_profile.txt (registration, open, cross-call tabs). Docs: apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md § Browser Rendering, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md §8.2, docs/TESTING.md, packages/moltlazy/AGENTS.md. Known limit: Playwright-backed snapshot/evaluate still need CDP session multiplexing; raw open/tabs/navigation/screenshots work.
  • A wedged container is no longer read as an empty one, and memory pressure is observed from the durable alarm. tenant-tarjetero-dev lost ~7 h 45 m of work on 2026-11-03: the Sandbox DO could not open a control session to a starved container (ContainerControlConnection.fetchUpgradeAttempt → AbortError), containerHasState() swallowed every probe error and returned false, and the recovery path therefore started a destructive 450 MB restore over a live filesystem. It timed out at 180 s, wrote restore-target.json { outcome: 'unknown' }, and every later boot was refused with RestoreInFlightError (restore-outcome-unknown) for 11 min at a time. Two defects fixed and one policy added (design: docs/plans/graceful-shutdown-and-emergency-checkpoints.md). (1) Absent ≠ unknown: probeContainerState() returns present | absent | unknown; restoreIfNeeded restores only on absent and throws the retryable ContainerStateUnknownError on unknown, without writing the restore-needed latch (a runtime with no exists() probe keeps the historical “assume empty” reading). (2) Continuous observation: checkGatewayMemoryHealth() is the single sampler for /api/health* and the ActivityScheduler alarm (runMemoryWatch()), so memory is sampled even when no browser polls health — the reason gateway-resources had no rows for ~17 h through the incident. Every fresh sample also writes gateway-memory-sample (state: running|absent, container limit) so a gap means “nobody sampled”, and healthWsHandler now passes its executionCtx (the detached watchdog promise was previously cancelled with the frame). (3) Two-stage policy: decideMemoryAction() checkpoints at 60 % of the cgroup limit and restarts at 75 %, escalating to checkpoint-and-restart when the newest archive is older than GATEWAY_MEMORY_LOSS_BUDGET_MS (15 min); the alarm enqueues the checkpoint as a trigger: 'memory-pressure' snapshot job before restarting, and maybeRestartGatewayForMemory delegates to the same policy so thresholds cannot drift. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (probeContainerState present/absent/unknown/malformed, restore refused with no latch), src/gateway/memory.test.ts (decideMemoryAction ladder, resolveMemoryCheckpointBytes), src/metrics.test.ts (trackGatewayMemorySample); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/plans/graceful-shutdown-and-emergency-checkpoints.md.
  • Platform docs are versioned per channel, and instances read the one that matches them. webs/fouria-docs now publishes latest (built from the newest v* release tag; /latest/, aliased by the root) and staging (built from develop; /staging/). Each build runs with its own base_url and a channel-aware sync-docs.ts (--channel/--base-path), so pages, assets, and /llms/** mirrors never cross channels; versions.json records the channel, commit, and component versions. A new release-notes/ section is compiled from each component’s CHANGELOG.md, making the notes factually compatible with the channel. build-deploy-tree.ts assembles both channels from their own checkouts (the release tag for latest, develop for staging) and the production deploy carries both, so /staging never lags. buildEnvVars forwards FOURIA_DOCS_CHANNEL / FOURIA_DOCS_BASE_URL / FOURIA_DOCS_FALLBACK_URL / FOURIA_VERSION (src/docs-channel.ts), and the fouria-docs skill + dev personas confirm the build via versions.json before quoting release notes. Tests: src/docs-channel.test.ts, src/gateway/env.test.ts, webs/fouria-docs/scripts/channel.test.ts; docs webs/fouria-docs/README.md, docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, docs/VERSIONING.md, docs/TESTING.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • OTLP ingest and promotion are private transports — neither has a public route. A staging capability run could not emit OTLP (302 to the Access login) or push a release, and the first attempt at a fix (path-scoped Access bypass apps + a PROMOTION_PUSH_TOKEN + a Dispatch isMachinePath exemption) still left two internet-facing endpoints gated only by a bearer. Replaced with the two transports the runtime already uses. (1) OTLP → sandbox bridge: the container exports to http://otel.internal/v1/{traces,metrics}, resolved by TenantSandbox.outboundByHost inside the Worker (src/sandbox-otel-bridge.ts), so the traffic never leaves the sandbox ↔ Worker control plane; /api/otel is no longer mounted, the ingest logic moved to src/otel-ingest.ts (framework-free, constant-time secret compare, no query-string token), and buildEnvVars always points the exporter at the bridge. OTEL_SHARED_SECRET is kept as the bridge’s inner credential. (2) Promotion → R2: the dev instance stages the sanitized bundle in its own bucket (promotion/staged/<id>.tar.gz + promotion/pending.json), and the production instance reads it through a read-only PROMOTION_SOURCE_BUCKET binding to its sibling dev bucket (services/promotion/r2-source.ts). Both buckets stay separate; there is no import route, no push token, no cross-host fetch. Production applies the pending release on boot, after the restore barrier and before the launch, or on POST /api/admin/releases/apply; the apply runs under the shared persistence lease (withPersistenceLease), is skipped while the tenant is parked or while a maintenance window/restore is in flight, and is idempotent (the container release pointer, which is part of the snapshot, is the applied marker — a restore cannot silently roll it back). Lerma provisions the sibling binding (promotion_source_bindings/2 in Instances and TenantProvisioner) only for environment: "production" and ensures the dev bucket exists before binding it. Removed: PROMOTION_PUSH_TOKEN everywhere, AccessPolicy.ensure_machine_access/1 and its path apps, the Dispatch isMachinePath exemption, /api/otel and /api/admin/releases/import. Tests: src/sandbox-otel-bridge.test.ts + test/otel-e2e.test.ts (bridge routing/auth/tenant scoping/limits), test/otel-e2e reworked for the virtual host, src/services/promotion/r2-source.test.ts (stage, pending validation, target gating, idempotency, park/busy/skip reasons, applied pointer), src/routes/api/releases.test.ts (stage 202, dev-only 409, apply+checkpoint, status availability), src/gateway/env.test.ts, src/index.test.ts (bridge registered, 401 without secret), tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs (PROMOTION_SOURCE_BUCKET binding); corpus tenant-isolation.txt, operational-modes.txt; docs ENV-VARIABLES.md, OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§5.4f), WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, TESTING.md, apps/lerma/README.md, secrets-manifest.schema.json.
  • A recovery point whose TTL lapsed is healed on the restore path, and a terminal boot failure is no longer presented as a retry. staging-client-dev sat on Restore attempt failed during "Restoring the backup" — retrying — no progress for 10 min: not a slow restore, but three ~250 ms failures followed by silence. The SDK refuses an archive past createdAt + meta.json.ttl (BackupExpiredError) before touching the container, and all three catalogued archives carried the old 7-day TTL (expired 2026-10-29) — the 10-year SNAPSHOT_ARCHIVE_TTL_SECONDS + extendArchiveTtl repair from #523 only runs as the repair step of a snapshot job, which a tenant that cannot boot never gets (chicken-and-egg). ensureArchiveRestorable (src/persistence.ts) now widens meta.json.ttl right after restore-target.json is published, in both restoreIfNeeded and restoreBackupById, and the SDK’s expiry wording (Backup &lt;id&gt; has expired (…), the code lives on the error object, not the message) is classified by isUnrecoverableArchiveError so a rewrite that cannot take effect drops the dead entry instead of looping. The page-side wedge is fixed too: readRecoveryState stops reporting a restore-target.json with outcome: "failed" as restoring, the ActivityScheduler records describeRestoreTerminalFailure when the boot job (or a manual restore job) exhausts its attempts — label Restore failed — &lt;reason&gt;, terminal: true, no idle annotation, cleared by the next boot.start — and loading.html gives a failed boot precedence over the leftover progress bar and renders the reason (Boot failed after N attempts: &lt;reason&gt;. Refresh the page to retry.). Operator lever (R2-only, works with the gateway down): POST /api/admin/storage/reconcile — note the -X POST; GET falls through to the gateway proxy and answers 503 Gateway not ready. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (ensureArchiveRestorable before the SDK call, already-widened untouched, expiry classified; readRecoveryState failed/unknown), src/activity/restore-progress.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts (terminal label, cleared on a new boot), src/assets/loading.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§4.4, §5.4e).
  • A gateway launch blocked by a corrupt OpenClaw state database now queues a doctor --fix repair and relaunches, instead of looping on “Starting OpenClaw Gateway”. A restored tenant can come back with a damaged state/openclaw.sqlite: OpenClaw’s schema preflight fails with database disk image is malformed (readSqliteUserVersion → inspectStateDatabaseSchema) and the gateway exits within seconds, so relaunching can never help. Two fixes. (1) The crash is detected immediately: the readiness wait now races a third signal, watchGatewayEarlyExit — the atomic cold start execs the gateway, so a non-zero exit of the supervised process before the port opens is a terminal launch failure (previously each attempt waited out the full STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS, the ~5-minute stale step and 311s page counter). A zero exit stays ignored (the “lost the startup-lock race to a healthy owner” path is decided by the existing port/lock adoption check), and waitForExit plumbing errors (a DO code update resets the control session) park the watcher instead of failing a healthy boot. (2) The documented repair is queued: src/gateway/state-db.ts classifies the launch diagnostics (database disk image is malformed, file is not a database, SQLITE_CORRUPT, …) and ensureGateway enqueues the durable doctor-repair job with reason: 'gateway-launch-state-database', then throws the retryable GatewayStateDatabaseRepairError. That reason makes the job (a) skip the post-restore gateway gate in preflight (awaitRestoredGatewayBeforeRepair({ requireGateway: false }) — waiting for a gateway the corruption blocks is a permanent deferral; the active-restore / maintenance-window checks stay) and (b) re-queue the durable boot when the repair succeeds, since the failed launch would otherwise never be retried; re-requests fold into the active job (MAINTENANCE_JOB_BUSY) and the ACTIVITY-less (local dev) path reports no-scheduler instead of throwing. The loading page follows it: /api/startup/ws pushes repair (ActivityScheduler.getActiveMaintenanceJob, a cheap read) and the page renders “Repairing the OpenClaw state database (openclaw doctor –fix, attempt N)…” and suppresses the slow-step notice, instead of the container’s stale launch step. Structured events: gateway.launch.state-database-repair (outcome queued/busy/no-scheduler/failed + signature) and sandbox.process.failed with failureReason: 'state-database-corrupt' | 'gateway-exited'. Tests: src/gateway/state-db.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts (corrupt launch queues the repair, early non-zero exit is a fast failure, a transport-dropped exit watch does not fail a healthy boot), src/activity/maintenance-jobs.test.ts (reason persists, active-job read), src/activity/scheduler.test.ts (no gateway gate for the reason, boot re-queued after success, ordinary repair unchanged), src/routes/public.test.ts (repair pushed/omitted), src/assets/loading.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§5.4f).
  • A restored container no longer re-runs the setup body when the launch happens in a different isolate than the restore. Instances recovered from a recovery point (rollout/reprovision, idle-sleep wake) were launching start-openclaw.sh start with the full setup body — re-onboarding and re-installing the plugins over a snapshot that is supposed to be authoritative. The zero-data-loss signal was keyed on the in-memory restore status (getRestoreStatus() → hadBackup && restored), which only exists in the isolate that ran the restore. The launch frequently runs elsewhere: the durable boot job is two steps (restore, then launch in a later alarm, so a DO eviction loses _restoreState), any request that wins the startup lock during the restore→launch window launches from its own isolate (where restoreIfNeeded only runs the cheap request-scoped check and records nothing), and clearPersistenceCache() (freeze / resume / stale recovery) resets it. New hasRestoredTenantState(sandbox) (src/persistence.ts) combines the in-memory result with the durable container-state probe (containerHasState — the restored openclaw.json, legacy /root or v1 /home layout); the image ships no config, so “state present” is exactly “already initialized/restored”. ensureGateway now sets OPENCLAW_RESTORED=true from that decision, and a brand-new tenant (no state, no backup) still gets the full setup body. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (hasRestoredTenantState: in-memory fast path, container-state fallback, brand-new container, probe failure), src/gateway/process.test.ts (launch env); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Zero-loss container rollouts: the tenant is parked before an image rollout and resumed after the replacement (checkpoint-park / resume). A container replacement always starts from a fresh disk, so it restores the checkpoint taken just before the rollout — anything written after that archive was produced was lost. The Worker now offers a park variant of the verified checkpoint: POST /control { X-FourIA-Control: checkpoint-park } takes the same snapshot but leaves the tenant drained and write-blocked, and X-FourIA-Control: resume releases it. Enforcement is two-layered (src/tenant-park.ts): tenantParkGuard middleware refuses mutating (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) /api/admin/* and /debug/* requests with 409 { code: "TENANT_PARKED" } (reads stay available; the durable record is the cross-isolate source of truth), and startShell calls assertTenantExecAllowed before the launch RPC so background/spawned work that never passes a route cannot start a process either. The park’s own path (quiesce/snapshot/restore) runs inside withTenantExecBypass, the only way past the lock. maintenance/replacement.json gained parked: true (beginMaintenance(..., { parked: true }), isTenantParked); an incomplete park un-arms the lock, closes the window and restores service exactly like a failed plain checkpoint, and the 15-minute TTL stays the crash backstop. resume deliberately does not pass skipRestore (the replacement container is empty and must rehydrate), clears the stale in-memory restore barrier (clearPersistenceCache, as freeze does), and is a no-op that never wakes a sleeping tenant. Other control actions (backup/freeze/unfreeze) are refused while parked. The Dispatch Worker allows/forwards both actions (CONTROL_ACTIONS/isControlAction), keeps the raised inline-snapshot CPU budget for checkpoint-park, and whitelists the parked/resumed echo fields. Lerma’s @upgrade_pipeline now parks at :checkpoint (fail-closed: an unavailable checkpoint aborts before the container is replaced; a sleeping instance is exempt), resumes at a new :resume step immediately after :dispatch_deploy, and resumes best-effort on both error paths. The bundle-only path Instances.upgrade_instance/3 (used by the staging validation promotion API) follows the same contract: parked checkpoint first, a failed or non-parked (parked: false) response aborts before the script upload, the park is released after the rollout settles and on every error path, and a sleeping instance skips the park entirely (no resume is sent). Live sessions are switched to read-only first and given a turn to finish: before the quiesce, drainLiveSessions (src/gateway/session-drain.ts, one operator.read+operator.write Gateway WS) reads sessions.list, patches every session to permissionMode: 'read-only' (exec denied, managed mutation tools omitted), and polls until the running turns end (bounded by SESSION_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS, 120 s — an outliving turn is reported as sessionsDrained: false and the park proceeds, so a slow turn never blocks a release; every write it made is already in the snapshot). Sessions already read-only are skipped and new sessions are untouched (the mode is per existing session, never a default). Because the mode lives on the session row it is inside the snapshot, so the previous modes are recorded outside the container (maintenance/session-modes.json, recordPendingSessionModes) and restored once a gateway is serving — resume waits SESSION_MODE_RESTORE_WAIT_MS and applies them, and launchRestoredState (post-restore.ts) applies them after any restore (the map is cleared only when every session was restored, so it retries on the next boot). An aborted park also restores them immediately. Telegram users are told by the ingress, not the model: while parked, POST /telegram-webhook/:account sends TELEGRAM_PARKED_NOTIFY_MESSAGE directly via the Bot API (notifyTenantParked), records a parked ingress event and returns 200 without enqueuing or waking; the queue consumer answers an already-queued update the same way and acks instead of retrying for the whole rollout. Tests: src/tenant-park.test.ts, src/maintenance.test.ts, src/gateway/sandbox-exec.test.ts, src/gateway/session-drain.test.ts, src/gateway/session-mode-restore.test.ts, src/telegram-ingress/{notify,status,route,queue}.test.ts, src/index.test.ts, workers/fouria-dispatch/test/unit/control.test.ts, apps/lerma/test/lerma/cloudflare/containers_test.exs, tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md (§ Rollout park), apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§2.5), apps/lerma/README.md. Not covered (separate work): the post-rollout readiness gate and fleet cohort/abort policy.
  • The dev memory watchdog is instance-aware, and new tenants default to a viable instance. GATEWAY_RSS_RESTART_BYTES was a hardcoded 3 GiB (justified as “3 of 4 GiB”); on a resized standard-3 (8 GiB) that is only 37% of the limit, so the watchdog would restart a healthy gateway. The threshold is now resolveMemoryRestartBytes() — 75% of the container’s cgroup memory limit (memory.max, with a cgroup v1 fallback), read in the same /proc exec as the RSS sample: 3 GiB on a 4 GiB standard-1, 4.5 GiB on standard-2, 6 GiB on standard-3, 9 GiB on standard-4. Because the limit is re-read on every sample, an instance-type rollout updates the threshold without a Worker deploy. Instances below 3 GiB are skipped (instance-too-small) — basic (1 GiB) cannot hold a healthy gateway (~1.1 GiB steady state), so a restart there can only loop; the gate sits under the 4 GiB standard-1 class so a cgroup that reports slightly less than nominal still gets a watchdog. Lerma.Instances.InstanceTypes.default/1, the Instance schema default, and Containers.deploy_script_and_container/1’s fallback now default to standard-1 instead of basic (1 GiB), which OOM-looped any instance provisioned without an explicit type. Resizing is a Cloudflare rollout (change_instance_type/2 → full_auto with target_configuration) that replaces the container, so plan one cold start + R2 restore per tenant. OPENCLAW_NO_RESPAWN=1 is kept (inert on every instance size); a real process-level replacement would need OPENCLAW_SUPERVISOR_MODE=external + a supervisor that preserves the single-owner startup lock. Tests: src/gateway/memory.test.ts, src/routes/public.test.ts, apps/lerma/test/lerma/instances/instance_types_test.exs, apps/lerma/test/lerma/instances_test.exs; docs docs/plans/sandbox-memory-usage.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, apps/lerma/README.md.
  • Phase 1 captures a Tier 1 workspace snapshot on eviction (flag-gated). TenantSandbox.onActivityExpired() now takes a platform filesystem snapshot immediately before eviction when WORKSPACE_SNAPSHOT=true and commits the handle at workspace/snapshot.json (versioned, image-pinned, one head handle). Capture never throws: captured / unsupported / failed / skipped become a workspace-snapshot Analytics Engine row, and the archive-then-stop path runs unchanged — Phase 1 never boots from the handle. Runtime prerequisite: Cloudflare only supports snapshots on a container application with scheduling_policy: "durable_object"; the tenant container is still on the default policy (the legacy SDK calls container.start() without an image), so the API is unavailable there and every attempt reports unsupported. SandboxV1 (already durable_object) implements the same snapshotWorkspace(), so the capability is real where the runtime allows it; the flag stays off until the tenant app is migrated. Tests: src/workspace-snapshot.test.ts, src/sandbox-do.test.ts, src/sandbox-v1.test.ts, src/metrics.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/cost-tracking.txt; docs docs/plans/persistent-workspace-phase1.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md §“Workspace snapshots on eviction”.
  • Persistence policy is measured before it is reworked (Phase 0). The backup-policy rework (two tiers: native container snapshots as the routine save path, the F4E1 archive as the recovery and portability tier) starts with telemetry and no behaviour change. Three Analytics Engine events now describe the current system: persistence-snapshot (end-to-end vs sandbox.createBackup() duration, captured bytes read once from the archive’s meta.json, trigger, and a skip/failure reason — interval-not-elapsed, unchanged, not-running, backup-lock-busy), persistence-restore (duration, bytes, recovery-point vs explicit, and archive-unusable recorded as a skip rather than a generic failure), and backup-change-window (continuous dirty time from dirtySince plus scan time, with the watch decision). SnapshotPhaseContext.trigger labels every snapshot; SnapshotArchive.sizeBytes is the one added metadata read. No snapshot, restore, retention, or eviction decision reads these rows. Queries and the Phase 1 gates: docs/plans/persistent-workspace-phase0.md. Tests: src/metrics.test.ts, src/persistence.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/backup-watch/watch.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/cost-tracking.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md §“Persistence policy telemetry (Phase 0)”.
  • OpenClaw migrated to 2026.10.9 (catalog.openclaw + the @openclaw/gateway-client / @openclaw/gateway-protocol pins in the root package.json; the plugin repo tracks and publishes the same release). 2026.10.9 is a security patch release (vulnerable dependency remediations, credential handling, workspace-only restrictions for Gateway-built delegation and media tools, malformed MCP address rejection) with no config-schema changes — the moltlazy openclaw config validate cctr contract passes unchanged, so no packages/moltlazy source change was needed. The Node engine floor stays >=24.22.1 <25 || >=26.12.1, so apps/fouria/Dockerfile keeps Node v24.22.1. The same PR hardens the sandbox memory limits in moltlazy: agents.defaults.compaction now uses maxActiveTranscriptBytes: '8mb' (from 20mb), keepRecentTokens: 12000 (from 20000), and midTurnPrecheck.enabled: true; session.maintenance now enforces maxDiskBytes: '512mb' / highWaterBytes: '384mb', maxEntries: 500, pruneAfter: '14d', resetArchiveRetention: '14d', and coldStorage: { enabled: true, afterDays: 7 } (OpenClaw’s 10 GB / 5000-entry / 30-day defaults do not fit a 4–12 GB container). Research findings: OpenClaw exposes no knob for the worker-thread pool or the RSS threshold, and basic (1 GiB) is below the gateway’s ~1.1 GiB steady-state RSS, so standard-1 is the practical instance floor and a hard restart remains the only RSS reset (see docs/plans/sandbox-memory-usage.md). No component CalVer bump — the release train handles that.
  • Runnable end-to-end example for declared software across a restore. test/e2e/fixture/software/gog-goplaces.json is the example manifest for a gateway whose openclaw/openclaw/gog and .../goplaces skills (ClawHub: @steipete/gog / @steipete/goplaces) need the gogcli (gog) and goplaces binaries, neither of which is in the image. It installs each binary from its pinned GitHub release (curl … | tar -xz -C /usr/local/bin, gog --version / goplaces --version as verify), so the packages are outside the /home/openclaw snapshot root and do not survive a container replacement. Two proofs: the local-only harness suite test/e2e-backup/zzz_software_binaries_restore.txt (%skip unless E2E_LOCAL=true: upload via PUT /api/admin/software/manifest → POST /api/admin/software/provision → openclaw skills install @steipete/{gog,goplaces} --global → backup (?inline=1) → /debug/destroy-container → restore → binaries back with an advanced report startedAt, skills still listed), and the dependency-free scripts/software-restore-smoke.sh (bun run test:software:smoke), which drives the same contract directly against the sandbox image (provision → install skills → snapshot → fresh container → restore → assert binaries gone/skills back → re-provision → assert versions and a fresh report) and passes locally in ~2 min. Docs: test/e2e-backup/README.md, docs/TESTING.md.
  • Gateway memory is observable from the Worker, and a dev instance self-heals before the container limit. Investigating a tenant-tarjetero-dev “reboot” required SSH-ing into the container to read /proc, dmesg and the gateway log, because nothing exposed the gateway’s RSS. (1) Observability (plan Phase 1): src/gateway/memory.ts reads VmRSS + Threads from /proc/<pid>/status for the gateway server (pgrep -x 'openclaw-gatewa', the same exact comm the soft reload targets, zombies skipped) in ONE shell exec, throttled to GATEWAY_RESOURCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL_MS (60s) so the frequent health poll adds at most one exec per interval. attachGatewayResources() (routes/public.ts) attaches it to /api/health, /api/health-snapshot and /api/health-ws as gateway: { pid, rssBytes, threads } — only while the snapshot is running, so a sleeping tenant is never woken — and writes a gateway-resources Analytics Engine row (double1 = RSS bytes, double2 = threads). (2) Watchdog (plan Phase 2.4): on a dev instance (isDevAgentsEnabled) at GATEWAY_RSS_RESTART_BYTES (3 GiB of the 4 GiB container) the gateway is replaced via killGateway + resetStartupCache + ensureGateway({ skipRestore: true, bypassMaintenance: true }) — the only lever that reclaims the per-worker_thread V8 heaps — with a 30-minute cooldown claimed before acting so concurrent health polls cannot double-restart, dispatched detached so a multi-minute replacement never delays a health response. Deliberate design: the threshold guards the container limit, not OpenClaw’s 1.5 GiB rss_threshold warning (which fires permanently on a healthy ~2.1 GiB dev gateway and would make the watchdog a restart loop), and there is no soft-reload step (a measured in-process SIGUSR2 restart does not reclaim RSS: 1.14 → 1.38 → 1.18 GiB). Production is excluded. Tests: src/gateway/memory.test.ts, src/metrics.test.ts (trackGatewayResources), src/routes/public.test.ts (sample attached + AE row, one read per interval, no sample when not running, no watchdog on a non-dev instance); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/plans/sandbox-memory-usage.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md (§5.4d).
  • OpenClaw migrated to 2026.10.8 (catalog.openclaw + the @openclaw/gateway-client / @openclaw/gateway-protocol pins in the root package.json; the plugin repo tracks and publishes the same release). 2026.10.8 is a bug-fix/security release: plugin lifecycle repairs (older plugins can process incoming messages again after an upgrade, scheduled plugin work no longer stops after startup/reload, and Gateway startup repairs stale managed plugin links left by an external OpenClaw reinstall — the state a warm R2 restore can produce), session-store fixes (relative session-store paths no longer fork a second database; openclaw doctor --fix repairs an already-split store), Doctor robustness on very large retained session histories (stack overflow / retained memory), and a trusted-proxy browser-auth fix that no longer writes gateway.auth.password or restarts the Gateway on first browser use. It also hardens POSIX exec allowlists (test -v / [ -v are no longer auto-trusted; moltlazy writes no exec allowlist, and the dev-only security.installPolicy allow is unaffected). No config-schema changes — the moltlazy openclaw config validate cctr contract passes unchanged, so no packages/moltlazy source change was needed — and the Node engine floor is unchanged at >=24.22.1 <25 || >=26.12.1, so no Dockerfile change. No component CalVer bump — the release train handles that.
  • Software provisioning is now usable mid-life and honest about its state. Three gaps closed around the softwareProvisioning feature. (1) On-demand reconcile: POST /api/admin/software/provision (ADMIN/ROOT) re-materializes the current R2 manifest, runs moltlazy software provision to completion (bounded by SOFTWARE_PROVISION_RUN_TIMEOUT_MS, 5 min) and returns the fresh report, so a manifest uploaded or corrected mid-life no longer waits for the next cold start; 409 { code: 'disabled' | 'no_manifest' } and 502 { code: 'failed', error } are distinct outcomes. (2) No cross-boot tick bleed: runSoftwareProvision truncates /tmp/software-progress.log before every run (resetProgressLog) — /tmp survives an in-place /debug/restart-openclaw, so the boot terminal used to interleave ticks from earlier boots. (3) Truthful dashboard states: GET /api/admin/software/{manifest,report} now return enabled (the flag), and the homepage widget separates “provisioning is disabled”, “instance is asleep”, “no report yet” and “no software declared”, with a Run provisioning button (ADMIN/ROOT) that renders the on-demand report and surfaces its error. parseSoftwareReport moved into src/gateway/software-provisioning.ts so the report, run and route paths share one shape check. Tests: src/gateway/software-provisioning.test.ts, src/routes/api/software.test.ts, src/client/pages/__tests__/HomePage.test.tsx, packages/moltlazy/tests/software/run.test.ts (progress-log reset), E2E test/e2e/zzz_software_provisioning.txt (on-demand run must install the new package and skip the already-installed one); corpus test/business-rules/dashboard-api-contract.txt, operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • OpenClaw migrated to 2026.10.6 (catalog.openclaw + the @openclaw/gateway-client / @openclaw/gateway-protocol pins in the root package.json; the plugin repo tracks and publishes the same release). 2026.10.6 is a security patch release (eMudhra certificate-compromise remediation, Windows setup/Doctor/Gateway startup fixes, Discord command and iPhone Talk fixes) with no config-schema changes: the moltlazy openclaw config validate cctr contract passes unchanged, so no packages/moltlazy source change was needed. It does raise OpenClaw’s Node engine floor from >=24.16.0 <25 || >=26.1.0 to >=24.22.1 <25 || >=26.12.1, so apps/fouria/Dockerfile now installs Node v24.22.1 (from v24.20.0) and its version gate compares major/minor/patch (24.22.0 is rejected). No component CalVer bump — the release train handles that.
  • Idle-sleep no longer re-archives an unchanged tenant, and deprovision snapshots reset the cadence. TenantSandbox.onActivityExpired() used to enqueue a full deprovision snapshot on every idle expiry; on a 422 MB tenant the snapshot’s own RPCs renewed the DO activity window, so stopIfIdle() refused, the next expiry snapshotted again, and the container never stopped (observed on tenant-tarjetero-dev: three 422 MB archives at 02:35/02:39/02:44 UTC plus three more at 05:39/05:43/05:49, ~3 GB/day, container running since Oct 21). The hook now reads the catalog first (hasRecentSnapshot() in src/persistence.ts, a pure read): a committed snapshot inside the idle window (resolveSleepAfterMs() — staging 15m, dev 2h, production 6h) already covers the unchanged filesystem, so it stops inline through stopIfIdle() without a new archive; no bucket or a read failure falls back to the durable backup-then-stop job (fail closed). Deprovision finalize now passes stampScheduled: true too, so a committed archive resets lastScheduledBackup and the next cron tick does not archive the same state again. Tests: src/sandbox-do.test.ts (recent snapshot stops inline, probe failure snapshots, no bucket skips the probe), src/persistence.test.ts (hasRecentSnapshot), src/activity/scheduler.test.ts (deprovision stamps), src/build-sandbox-options.test.ts (resolveSleepAfterMs); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • The dev Fouria Builder heartbeat is reconciled to its intended cadence. OpenClaw 2026.10.5 retired agents.entries.*.heartbeat: heartbeats are ordinary automation jobs, and config reloads/restarts never rewrite an existing job. The migrated heartbeat-fouria-builder job therefore kept the default 30-minute cadence for 9 days on tenant-tarjetero-dev despite moltlazy’s heartbeat.every: 12h, running full agent turns on the main session (~317k tokens each) until the OpenCode subscription hit 0% (402 Insufficient account funds → agent-runner-failure). start-openclaw.sh gains a dev-only ensure_dev_heartbeat_cadence (post-start) that reads openclaw automations get <id> --json, compares schedule.everyMs / sessionTarget / payload.lightContext, and only then edits the job to --every 12h --session isolated --light-context (split so a rejected --light-context cannot lose the cadence fix). Idempotent: a matching job is never touched, so the schedule anchor is not reset on every boot. Docs packages/moltlazy/AGENTS.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Backup catalog reads are pure; catalog healing has an explicit entry point (audit finding F3). GET /api/admin/storage/backups (getBackupHistory) used to run reconcileOrphanedBackups on every dashboard poll — listing backups/, reading meta.json, adopting orphans, deleting over-cap archives, and writing backup-handle.json from a GET. It now performs three parallel reads (getPersistenceStore, getStableBackup, isRecoveryHeld) and nothing else. The write path is reconcileCatalogState (adoption + retention prune inside the etag-CAS mutation, reporting the ids it changed) → repairBackupCatalog (sweep metadata-less uploads + in-place encryption) → refreshed history, exposed as reconcileBackupCatalog; the durable repair step now runs it before the gate step of every scheduled snapshot, so the catalog still self-heals after a killed invocation (issue #344). Restore/schedule keep their inline reconcile, debug/reprovision reconciles before deciding nothing is restorable (a crashed upload must not look unrecoverable), and operators get POST /api/admin/storage/reconcile (ADMIN/ROOT). The history panel polls GET /api/admin/storage/jobs/:id (getBackupJobStatus) while a snapshot is in flight instead of re-listing the catalog every 5s, falling back to the history diff when no job id is returned. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts, src/persistence-encryption.test.ts, src/routes/api/storage.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/routes/debug.test.ts, src/client/components/__tests__/BackupHistoryPanel.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, docs/plans/durable-agents-rules-audit.md.
  • A config repair is deferred until a restore settles and the gateway is up on the restored state, and the restored config becomes the stable/latest config version. A restore replaces the writable layer but launches nothing, so a doctor --fix applied around it was silently overwritten by the next re-apply of the recovery point (suspected on tenant-tarjetero-dev after a config fix). (1) Every successful restore (restoreIfNeeded, restoreBackupById) writes a durable restore-config-pending.json marker. (2) The boot job, the durable restore job, and the sync/async-fallback admin restore route finish through the shared launchRestoredState (src/post-restore.ts): ensureGateway({ waitForReady: true }) on the restored state, then captureRestoredConfigVersion writes configs/<ts>.json + stable/config.json (the newest/stable version) and clears the marker. A gateway-launch failure does not re-run the destructive restore: restore jobs succeed with detail: "gateway-launch-pending", the sync route returns gatewayReady: false, and the marker drives the next tick. (3) doctor-repair checks an active restore job, getPersistenceBusyReason (maintenance window / restore in flight), and the pending marker before running; when blocked it throws MaintenanceJobDeferredError, and runMaintenanceJobAlarm reschedules it every 60s without consuming an attempt (previously three deferrals would have failed the job before the restore finished). Tests: src/activity/maintenance-jobs.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/persistence.test.ts, src/routes/api/storage.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Diagnostics dashboard is skip-not-park and non-blocking. DiagnosticDashboard only dispatches its container reads (/api/admin/config/raw, /api/admin/config) while the gateway is actually running (useGatewayRunning() — snapshot.readiness.ok, ignoring the ROOT breaker bypass) and re-runs them when it comes back; the debug-routes flag (Worker-local) still loads. Every load is deferred after paint (scheduleAfterPaint → requestIdleCallback, setTimeout(0) fallback), so no widget waits on a container response: ConfigSection gained a gatewayReady prop and now keeps its tabs/editor visible with a non-blocking “Loading configuration…” / “Waiting for the gateway to start…” notice instead of swapping the whole panel for a spinner; devices render a waiting state; config loads never clobber text typed before the response arrived. Gateway-only actions (device list/approve, config save, channel probe) are guarded, and the Debug Tools that only make sense against a live gateway (gateway-api, stop-gateway) are skipped with an inline explanation — container diagnostics (logs/processes/version/sqlite) and recovery actions (restart/rescue/destroy) stay available so a down gateway can still be inspected and revived. Repair stays available outside the editor: doctor --fix is the recovery action for a down gateway, so runRepair no longer requires a running gateway, a dedicated Repair Environment bar (data-testid="repair-environment-button", ADMIN/ROOT) sits above the widgets and is disabled only while a repair is in flight, and ConfigSection’s repair button stays enabled while gatewayReady is false. Tests: src/client/pages/__tests__/DiagnosticDashboard.test.tsx, src/client/components/__tests__/ConfigSection.test.tsx, src/client/GatewayHealthContext.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/dashboard-api-contract.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/TESTING.md.
  • Billable emission: staging always emits, BILLABLE_EVENTS opts a dev instance in. Both emit sites (POST /api/otel/v1/traces and the CRON_BILLABLE_DRAIN cron drain) previously gated on the strict billable cost axis (resolveInstanceDimensions(env).billable = production platform + production environment), so staging and dev instances could never exercise the billing pipeline. They now call isBillableEventsEnabled(env) (src/dev-mode.ts): billable production always emits and cannot be opted out, the staging platform always emits in every environment (mirroring production so billing is validated before release; the rows land in the staging Analytics Engine dataset), and a dev environment emits only with BILLABLE_EVENTS=true. Emission only: getCostContext keeps the real platform/environment dimensions (staging/dev remain non-billable cost axes) and shouldAutoSleep is untouched, so staging keeps its 15m idle timeout and an opted-in dev instance its 2h one. The emitting path omits the guard’s billable: false marker (the local-E2E skip, whose worker is a dev instance via DEV_MODE, is unaffected). Tests: src/dev-mode.test.ts, src/routes/otel-traces.test.ts (staging emits, dev opt-in emits), src/index.test.ts (cron drain: dev drops, staging and dev-with-override emit), src/build-sandbox-options.test.ts (sleep policy unchanged); corpus test/business-rules/dev-expense.txt; docs docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, docs/TESTING.md, apps/fouria/README.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, .dev.vars.example.
  • Request paths never run a destructive archive restore, and a container stops only on verified inactivity (investigated on tenant-tarjetero-dev, which appeared to “reboot” while in active use). (1) The container instance had not restarted (started_at 00:18, still running); what died was the gateway process ([Gateway] Gateway process … has terminal state: exited), and the follow-up boot ran a 350 MB archive restore under request execution contexts. sandbox.restoreBackup was aborted at ~30.1 s (backup.restore error … The operation was aborted (30177ms), plus sandbox.exec … The operation was aborted (30001ms) for health probes/umount and the workerd “promise resolved in a different request context” warning) because Cloudflare cancels a request’s background continuations shortly after the response — so the restore never finished and every reload re-attempted it (6 boot jobs + 8 restore errors in one hour). Fix: restoreIfNeeded(..., { restoreOwner: 'request' }) (the ensureGateway default) performs only the cheap non-destructive checks (the restore-needed latch + containerHasState()) and otherwise throws RestoreDeferredToBootJobError; ensureGateway requests the durable boot job and throws GatewayBootPendingError (proxy answers 503/loading). Durable callers (ActivityScheduler boot/wake jobs, the queue consumer) pass restoreOwner: 'durable'. The proxy’s three inline restoreIfNeeded calls (proxy.request, proxy.websocket-recovery, proxy.fetch-recovery) were removed. (2) A container is now stopped only after a stop-time inactivity check: TenantSandbox.stopIfIdle() re-reads the DO’s own idle window (renewed by every request) and the process list, and the deprovision job calls it after its multi-minute snapshot instead of sandbox.stop(); if the tenant became active meanwhile the job is skipped (active:<reason>). Refusals: activity, transient-activity, probe-failed, billable-production, not-running. Tests: src/sandbox-do.test.ts (stopIfIdle cases), src/activity/scheduler.test.ts (stop-time skip), src/gateway/process.test.ts (deferral + restoreOwner), src/persistence.test.ts (request deferral / state-present short-circuit), src/index.test.ts (proxy no longer restores); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, webs/fouria-docs/.../worker-development.md, operator-guide.md.
  • OpenClaw migrated to 2026.10.5 (catalog.openclaw + the @openclaw/gateway-client / @openclaw/gateway-protocol pins in the root package.json; the plugin repo tracks the same release). One breaking change hit moltlazy: the 2026.10.5 config schema retired agents.defaults.compaction.enabled (embedded auto-compaction is no longer toggleable) and retired compaction.truncateAfterCompaction (“byte-triggered compaction now opts in via maxActiveTranscriptBytes alone”) — openclaw config validate rejects both keys with Invalid input, which broke the moltlazy cctr config-save contract. AGENT_DEFAULTS.compaction now emits only maxActiveTranscriptBytes: '20mb' + keepRecentTokens: 20000, preserving the sandbox OOM transcript bound. The runtime zod schema still accepts the retired keys, so only the config validate contract (and the published schema) caught it. Tests: packages/moltlazy/tests/agents.test.ts (asserts neither retired key is emitted); docs packages/moltlazy/AGENTS.md.
  • Local development runs on the Cloudflare Vite plugin instead of wrangler dev. bun run dev:worker / bun start start the Worker with vite dev (vite.config.ts), the same plugin bun run build already used; bun run dev serves the admin SPA from vite.ui.config.ts (:8787) and proxies to the Worker (:8788). Local E2E fixtures (test/e2e/fixture/server/start-local, start-local-pair) launch vite dev, pass the old --var overrides through the plugin’s config hook (E2E_WORKER_NAME, PERSIST_STATE_PATH, VITE_CACHE_DIR, VITE_INSPECTOR_PORT), install test/e2e/.dev.vars into the Worker config directory for the run (the plugin has no --env-file; stop-local* restores the developer’s file), and fire cron ticks through /cdn-cgi/local/scheduled instead of /__scheduled. --env is gone from the deploy/dry-run scripts: CLOUDFLARE_ENV=… selects the environment at build time and wrangler deploy discovers the generated dist/fouria/wrangler.json via .wrangler/deploy/config.json. Docs: README.md, docs/DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/TESTING.md, apps/fouria/README.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, test/e2e*/README.md.
  • /healthz is now a real, fast liveness route. It previously fell through to the gateway-proxy catch-all (app.all('*')), which ran restoreIfNeeded + ensureGateway + a waitForGatewayReady port wait — on a cold/sleeping instance GET /healthz took ~108 s and was killed by the platform before responding (Workers Observability on tenant-client-dev: GET /healthz → 503 @ ~108 s avg, 348 requests in 2 h). The new GET /healthz does exactly one non-waking isRuntimeActive() read and returns 200 { ok, ts, status } (active | idle) sub-second, never warming the container or probing the gateway; readiness stays on /api/health. It sits on the tenant hostname, so it stays behind the host Access app (not public). Tests: src/routes/public.test.ts (/healthz 200 + no ensureGateway/exec/listProcesses; idle when the runtime is off); docs apps/fouria/README.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/WORKER-HEALTH.md.
  • Browser health endpoints moved to Access-safe sibling paths (/api/health-ws, /api/health-snapshot, /api/health-components). On tenant hostnames every browser WebSocket and fetch() under /api/health or /api/health/* failed (WebSocket connection to 'wss://…/api/health/ws?passive=1' failed, plus CORS/redirect failures on GET /api/health/components and GET /api/health): the path-scoped FourIA Health - <slug> Access app shadows those paths and its AUD is distinct from the host app’s (Cloudflare ignores a requested aud on create and update — verified against the live API — so the AUDs cannot be unified). A browser logged into the host app therefore gets a cross-origin 302 login redirect to *.cloudflareaccess.com on /api/health*, which WebSocket handshakes cannot follow and browser fetch() rejects on CORS. The sibling paths /api/health-ws, /api/health-snapshot, and /api/health-components sit outside the health app’s path prefix, so the host-app session the browser already holds passes (verified against live staging-client-dev.fouria.io: /api/health-* resolves to the host app kid, while /api/health and /api/health/* resolve to the health app kid). The Worker mounts the handlers at both path sets (healthHandler, healthComponentsHandler, healthWsHandler in src/routes/public.ts); api.ts (subscribeHealth, getHealth, getCloudflareComponents) and loading.html use the - sibling paths, while /api/health, /api/health/ws, and /api/health/components remain for headless service-token clients (lerma). Tests: src/routes/public.test.ts, src/assets/loading.test.ts, UI stubs test/ui/support/api.ts + test/ui/cloudflare-components.spec.ts; docs apps/fouria/README.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/WORKER-HEALTH.md, docs/TESTING.md; lerma access_policy.ex documents the constraint.
  • Telegram ingress queue observability: notification-bell entry + home status widget. The per-tenant TelegramIngress DO now records every ingress event (bounded counters + last 20) — queued (a cold update was enqueued and woke the container), forwarded (hot path), delivered, and failed — via telegram-ingress/status.ts, wired from the webhook route (queued/forwarded) and the queue consumer (delivered/failed). GET /api/admin/telegram-ingress/status returns the snapshot and GET /api/admin/telegram-ingress/ws streams it (a frame per change, TELEGRAM_INGRESS_WS_POLL_INTERVAL_MS, rotated). The admin shell’s TelegramIngressProvider opens the socket only while the feature is in use (an account is registered or activity exists) and raises a notification-bell entry (“Telegram message queued — waking your instance”, or a delivery-failure alert); the new TelegramIngressWidget on the home page shows state + queued/delivered/failed + last event, hidden until in use. Tests: src/telegram-ingress/status.test.ts, src/routes/api/telegram-ingress.test.ts, src/client/__tests__/telegram-ingress-context.test.tsx, src/client/components/__tests__/TelegramIngressWidget.test.tsx, src/client/pages/__tests__/HomePage.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/dashboard-api-contract.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Homepage no longer crashes with Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'length'). GET /api/admin/software/report ran cat <report> 2>/dev/null || echo '{}', so a tenant whose moltlazy software provision had never run got a truthy report: {}; the homepage Software widget then read software.packages.length and threw on render (only for ADMIN — ROOT lands on diagnostics). The route now returns report: null unless the payload is a real report (an object with a packages array), and HomePage reads software?.packages ?? [] defensively. Tests: src/routes/api/software.test.ts (missing/partial report → null), src/client/pages/__tests__/HomePage.test.tsx (truthy {} renders the empty state instead of crashing).
  • Release CD promotes the already-built artifacts instead of rebuilding. deploy-fouria.yml used to docker build the container image from source and re-build the wrangler bundle at release time; it now promotes what CI already built: it resolves the release’s develop-mainline build commit (git rev-list -n1 --first-parent --invert-grep --grep='^chore: release' <tag> -- apps/fouria/ .github/workflows/test.yml), retags the Cloudflare registry image fouria:unstable-<sha> → fouria:<tag> + latest (minting short-lived pull+push registry credentials via POST /accounts/{id}/containers/registries/{host}/credentials, mirroring Lerma’s ImageRegistry), and copies the CI bundle fouria-bundles:unstable-<sha>/fouria.mjs → <tag>/ + latest/ in R2. deploy-dashboard.yml now tags the develop build with an immutable lerma:sha-<sha> in addition to :latest-pre, and its promote job pins to that per-commit image (resolving the release’s lerma build commit the same way) instead of the floating :latest-pre (falling back only for the first release after the tag is introduced). Docs: docs/DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/TESTING.md, apps/lerma/DEPLOY.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md. Both workflows validated with actionlint.
  • Durable doctor-repair/SQLite jobs start immediately, and their status streams over a WebSocket instead of 2s polling. A doctor-repair job enqueued at 12:57:30 only began at 13:02:11 — exactly the previous boot job’s 14-minute lease — because the ActivityScheduler owns one alarm and a stale arm (the alarm handler’s trailing re-arm, or a warm-path refresh) could read “no pending job”, then execute its setAlarm(later)/deleteAlarm() after the just-enqueued job’s setAlarm(now), postponing it. scheduleCombinedAlarm now writes through armWithGenerationGuard (activity/alarm.ts): it bumps a stored generation, and a superseded arm abandons its stale write so the newest arm (fresh read) owns the alarm. The dashboard no longer polls GET /api/admin/config/fix/jobs/:id every 2s (one request + Worker log line per tick for the whole multi-minute repair): a new GET /api/admin/config/fix/jobs/:id/ws (and the /debug/sqlite-integrity/jobs/:id/ws variant) streams the job (routes/api/maintenance-ws.ts) — a frame only on status change, close 1000 when terminal, and a rearm() self-heal while active. The client’s subscribeMaintenanceJob is WS-first with a slow HTTP fallback only while the socket is down, and DiagnosticDashboard renders a live MaintenanceJobModal (queued/running/attempt/elapsed, run-in-background) instead of a bare spinner, with a banner to reopen it after backgrounding. Tests: src/activity/alarm.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/routes/api/maintenance-ws.test.ts, src/client/__tests__/maintenance-job-subscription.test.tsx, src/client/pages/__tests__/DiagnosticDashboard.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/dashboard-api-contract.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Sandbox memory OOM mitigation (dev instance). A dev instance grew RSS past OpenClaw’s 1.5 GiB rss_threshold (worker-thread V8 heaps + native arenas, not the main isolate) driven by cron-replayed heavy agentTurn jobs. (1) packages/moltlazy AGENT_DEFAULTS.compaction sets enabled: true, maxActiveTranscriptBytes: '20mb', keepRecentTokens: 20000 so a provider-side-managed session can no longer grow its persisted transcript unbounded (the fouria-builder:main ~407k-token session inflates the SQLite history and worker heaps). (2) The dev-only Fouria Builder entry sets heartbeat.every: '12h' plus isolatedSession: true / lightContext: true — OpenClaw’s default 30m heartbeat is a full agent turn ~48×/day that also triggers memory-core dreaming reconciliation. (3) start-openclaw.sh slows memory-core’s dreaming sweep to weekly (frequency: "0 3 * * 1", dev-gated) — the ~6-min daily sweep is replayed on every wake (cron: running missed jobs after restart) and produced the 1.6 → 2.08 GiB RSS spike. (4) ensure_opencode_credits_automation dedupes via openclaw cron list --all --json in addition to the legacy automations list (which missed a prior boot’s job, creating two duplicate opencode-credits-check cron jobs). Tests: packages/moltlazy/tests/agents.test.ts; docs packages/moltlazy/AGENTS.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Boot log streams gateway-launch progress (fixes “Launching the gateway — no progress for 6 min”). start-openclaw.sh now starts a start_boot_log_stream mirror in launch_gateway_process that tails the gateway’s own --verbose stdout (/tmp/gateway-stdout.log) into the curated boot log (/tmp/startup.log) — so the loading page can follow SQLite migration → plugin load → port bind instead of going blank the moment start/launch execs the gateway. post-start/full stop the mirror (stop_boot_log_stream) and truncate the buffer at readiness. The Worker’s /api/startup/ws stream now reads the boot log while processType === 'gateway' (not just 'script'), and loading.html shows the log panel during gateway startup — restyled as a vintage CRT terminal (title bar + traffic lights + phosphor text + scanlines) — instead of hiding it behind the logo. Tests: src/assets/loading.test.ts, src/routes/public.test.ts; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Loading page no longer gives up on its own. loading.html had two client-side budget specs — a 5-error retry cap (maxConsecutiveErrors, Retrying... (n/5)) and an 8-minute wall-clock deadline (MAX_WAIT_MS / deadline → runDoctorAndShow()). Since the cold boot moved to the durable ActivityScheduler boot job (which owns retries and terminal failure), the page’s self-imposed give-up only interrupted a legitimately long startup: it now waits indefinitely (WebSocket push, with an unlimited 5s HTTP-poll fallback) and reports terminal failure solely from boot.status === 'failed' and permanent degraded container errors. Removed the now-dead runDoctorAndShow/showStructuredError/showError helpers. Tests: src/assets/loading.test.ts; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Restore decrypt no longer exhausts the Worker CPU budget, and interrupted restores are labelled honestly. A large recovery archive (tenant-tarjetero-dev) was killed with Worker exceeded CPU time limit mid-Decrypting backup … and retried in a loop. encryptStream/decryptStream (src/crypto/backup-encryption.ts) grew each 4 MiB chunk with concat on every ~64 KB R2 read, recopying the pending chunk ~64× over; a ByteQueue now copies each byte once (96 MiB decrypt: 1.5 s → 0.14 s at 64 KB reads, 5.6 s → 0.14 s at 16 KB). The R2 binding delivers the archive in 4 KiB reads (64 MiB → 16,385 reads), which is why the per-read copy dominated; each restore now logs [crypto] Decrypt read profile (reads, bytes, max/avg read, chunks) so the pattern can be checked on a live tenant. The loading bar also showed the last durable phase (Waiting for the backup lock 3%) as if still live: a failed attempt is now labelled Restore attempt failed during "<phase>" — retrying (recordRestoreFailure), and an idle record gets — no progress for N min (describeRestoreProgressIdle); the fraction never moves backward. Tests: src/crypto/backup-encryption.test.ts, src/activity/restore-progress.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Recovery progress bar synchronized with the durable object’s events. During a restore the loading page showed a generic spinner; it now shows a progress bar driven by the ActivityScheduler DO’s own phase events, not a client-side timer. restoreIfNeeded/restoreBackupById call their onProgress(phase) hook on every persistence.phase; the DO wires it to recordRestoreProgress, which maps the phase to a label + a monotonic fraction (describeRestoreProgress in activity/restore-progress.ts, cumulative phase weights) and exposes it via getRestoreProgress(). /api/startup/ws (and non-passive /api/health, plus /api/admin/boot-state) push restoreProgress: { phase, label, fraction }; loading.html renders the bar and hides the stepper while a restore is in flight, then switches back to the container’s startup-progress.json stepper once the gateway launch begins (an indeterminate bar covers a request-scoped restore with no DO feed). Also declares getBootJob/getRestoreProgress on ActivitySchedulerStub (fixing the public.ts type error). Tests: src/activity/restore-progress.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/routes/public.test.ts, src/routes/api/misc.test.ts, src/assets/loading.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Restore legibility: name the backup + date being loaded (and mark the recovery point). A cold restore showed only a generic “Restoring data from backup…” spinner, so an operator could not tell which snapshot was loading. (1) Durable recovery state. restoreIfNeeded/restoreBackupById now write restore-target.json (the archive being applied) just before sandbox.restoreBackup and clear it on success; readRecoveryState(bucket) returns { restoring, committed } (committed = stable-backup.json). It is read from R2, not the per-isolate restoreStatus, because the durable boot/restore runs in the ActivityScheduler DO whose in-memory state the request isolate cannot see. (2) Surfaced on the loading page. /api/health (non-passive, not-yet-ready) and /api/startup/ws attach recovery (bounded by RECOVERY_STATE_TIMEOUT_MS, fail-soft to null; lerma’s passive poll never pays the read); loading.html renders “Restoring backup — ” (or “Recovery point …”) and its isRestoring also honours recovery.restoring. (3) Dashboard. BackupsPage threads stableBackupId to BackupHistoryPanel, which marks the recovery point with a recovery point badge + a “A cold boot restores — ” summary. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (readRecoveryState, restore-target publish/clear), src/assets/loading.test.ts, src/client/components/__tests__/BackupHistoryPanel.test.tsx, src/routes/public.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Manual-restore hardening: recovery-point flag, writer quiesce, and no restore loop. Restoring an older archive from the Backups page could not be applied without either making it permanent or being silently undone. Three fixes in src/persistence.ts + the storage route/durable job. (1) setCurrent flag. POST /api/admin/storage/restore/:id?setCurrent=0 (also ?async=1&setCurrent=0) passes { setRecoveryPoint: false } to restoreBackupById so the archive is applied without force-promoting it to stable-backup.json (the default still promotes; the durable BackupJobRequest/BackupJobRecord carry the flag so a retried job keeps the intent). The Backups page exposes it as a Set as recovery point checkbox (checked by default). (2) Stop writers on the lease. restoreBackupById now opens a cross-isolate maintenance window (maintenance/replacement.json, operation restore) and stops the gateway the moment it takes the shared restore lease (the route no longer pre-kills before the lock), closing the window in a finally; a live gateway/automation/channel therefore cannot keep writing while sandbox.restoreBackup replaces the writable layer. (3) No remount loop. restoreIfNeeded refuses to run while any maintenance window is active (and ensureGateway already refuses to launch), so a health/proxy refetch cannot restart the gateway and re-run the restore against the committed recovery point — the restore → stop → refetch → remount-the-latest loop. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (set-recovery-point, maintenance window, deferred restore), src/persistence-encryption.test.ts, src/routes/api/storage.test.ts, src/activity/scheduler.test.ts, src/activity/backup-jobs.test.ts, src/client/components/__tests__/BackupHistoryPanel.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Durable cold-boot job + slim health probe (observed on tenant-client-dev: start-openclaw.sh never ran; phase=restore, age=686365ms; 141 waitUntil() tasks did not complete; /api/health?passive=1 at error level ×98). (1) Durable boot. The cold boot (R2 restore → gateway launch) was driven from a request’s ctx.waitUntil(), which Cloudflare cancels shortly after the response — so a restore that outlived it was killed mid-flight (Decrypting backup … ×14) and start-openclaw.sh was never reached while every poll parked on the stuck start promise. It is now a durable job on the ActivityScheduler DO (src/activity/boot-job.ts): /api/warmup, non-passive /api/health, and /api/startup/ws only request it (deduped) and return; the DO alarm performs restoreIfNeeded → ensureGateway and retries on a bounded lease. Falls back to the request-scoped boot when ACTIVITY is absent. (2) sandbox.restoreBackup is bounded by RESTORE_BACKUP_TIMEOUT_MS (a hung control channel fails fast instead of holding the restore phase for 11 min). (3) The restore reports sub-phase progress so isGatewayStartStuck judges restore on GATEWAY_RESTORE_NO_PROGRESS_MS of no progress (setGatewayStartProgress) — a slow-but-advancing restore is not killed. (4) withLease releases the shared R2 lease when its request aborts (PersistenceDiagnosticContext.signal), so a cancelled operation can’t leave restore-needed + a held backup-lock re-triggering the loop. Also: /api/health now issues one gateway /health exec shared by readiness + liveness (was a duplicate curl pair per poll) and the passive path skips the container + R2 component probe (lerma’s frequent probe never reads components). Tests: src/activity/boot-job.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts, src/gateway/health-probes.test.ts, src/routes/public.test.ts, src/persistence.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Slimmer /api/health (frequent lerma probe). Two per-poll costs removed. (1) Readiness and liveness each ran the same gateway /health curl, so every poll spawned a pair of identical curl processes (visible as paired entries in /debug/processes); getHealthSnapshot now fetches the process scan and the /health probe once, in parallel, and reuses both across the probes (new HealthProbeOptions.health). (2) The component probe (an isRuntimeActive read + an R2 HEAD of backup-handle.json) was built on every /api/health, including lerma’s frequent ?passive=1 poll — which never reads components; the passive path now skips componentsForHealth entirely (the non-passive path and the dedicated GET /api/health/components are unchanged). Tests: src/gateway/health-probes.test.ts (single shared exec), src/routes/public.test.ts (passive omits components); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Restore config guard + recovery-point promotion (observed on tenant-tarjetero-dev). After the v2026.10.13 container rollout, an explicit restore of an older known-good backup did not stick: the redeploy changed the container runtime mid-restore, and a concurrent scheduled snapshot captured the partially-restored state and was auto-promoted to the stable recovery point, so the next cold boot restored the wrong archive and launched the gateway with no config. Three fixes: (1) start-openclaw.sh only honours OPENCLAW_RESTORED=true when $CONFIG_FILE exists — otherwise it runs the setup body — so a “restored” boot with no materialized config (interrupted restore, or restoreIfNeeded’s “container already holds tenant state” short-circuit) can no longer launch OpenClaw configless. (2) restoreBackupById now force-promotes the restored archive to stable-backup.json (promoteStableBackup(bucket, entry, { force: true })) so an explicit restore becomes the recovery point even when it predates the current one; the default pointer still only advances forward in time. (3) the pre-backup config cleanup used .${CONFIG_DIR} with CONFIG_DIR='.openclaw', building /home/openclaw/..openclaw/… (a never-existent path, so the cleanup silently no-oped) — it now uses ${CONFIG_DIR}. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (force-promote; cleanup path); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, apps/fouria/docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Cold-start latency + boot legibility (a full non-restored boot on staging-client-dev took ~14 min). Two causes, both fixed, plus a loading-page alert. (1) Non-owner killed the booting gateway. A non-owner isolate that observed the start-openclaw.sh start wrapper waited a fresh STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS (300s) from its own observation, but the wrapper’s real boot is setup (~290s) + gateway bootstrap (~45s) ≈ 335s — so the waiter timed out ~35s early and kill()ed the process just as it had execed into the gateway, releasing the startup lock and making the waiting second wrapper re-run the whole setup. Confirmed via Workers Observability: Startup script present but gateway never became reachable … killing and restarting = 1 while the warm-probe start/catch = 0/0 (ruling out the 30s warm probe). Fixed with STARTUP_WRAPPER_STUCK_BUDGET_MS (STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS + GATEWAY_START_STUCK_GRACE_MS): the non-owner’s stuck check and readiness wait are measured from the wrapper’s startedAt (mirroring the owner’s watchdog) and a /health re-probe runs immediately before any kill. Tests: src/gateway/process.test.ts, src/gateway/process-extra.test.ts. (2) Plugin detection read the hanging registry. plugin_is_installed ran openclaw plugins list --json, which hangs for its full CLI_TIMEOUT and reads as “not installed” on a hung/partial list, so the pre-installed guard fell through and triggered a needless network install (ai-gateway ~57s + otel ~74s). Replaced with plugin_extension_present (the extensions/<id> dir the gateway actually loads). (3) Bootup-UI alert. The loading page now shows a non-fatal slow-step notice (step name + elapsed seconds) once a step overruns SLOW_STEP_MS (120s), so a slow-but-progressing boot is distinguishable from a stuck one without opening logs. Tests: src/assets/loading.test.ts. Corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/plans/cold-start-latency.md.
  • The tenant Usage & Billing widget no longer 403s on Analytics Engine. GET /api/admin/costs/v2/summary resolved its AE SQL token as ANALYTICS_ENGINE_API_TOKEN ?? CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN, but Lerma never provisioned the dedicated token, so the query fell back to CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN — the AI Gateway credential alias, which lacks Account Analytics:Read — and logged [cost-summary] Analytics Engine query failed with HTTP 403 on every load (observed on tenant-client-dev), zeroing the widget. The token is now a Lerma platform secret (tenant_provisioner.ex @platform_secrets), read from Lerma’s environment and deployed per-tenant as a secret_text binding; the deploy path wires it through mix lerma.deploy, Ansible app-config, docker-compose.prod.yml/.pre.yml, and deploy-dashboard.yml, and the secrets manifest. Optional: when unset the worker still degrades to an all-zero summary. Tests: tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs, tenant_provisioner_integration_test.exs; docs docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, apps/lerma/README.md, apps/fouria/docs/cost-observability.md, SECRETS.example.yaml, docs/schemas/secrets-manifest.schema.json.
  • Zero-data-loss: a restored container skips the setup body. The R2 restore runs in the Worker (restoreIfNeeded → sandbox.restoreBackup()) before start-openclaw.sh; when that restore actually restored a backup, ensureGateway now passes OPENCLAW_RESTORED=true in the launch env (gated on getRestoreStatus().hadBackup && restored, so a brand-new tenant with no backup still onboards), and the script skips the whole setup body — onboard → plugin installs → moltlazy patch → config validate — emitting those phases as skipped and launching the gateway directly from the restored filesystem. The restored state is authoritative: the cold-start budget is spent launching it, not re-mutating it (which could diverge from or clobber the snapshot). Each boot rewrites a durable receipt at /tmp/openclaw-restored-setup-skipped (written on the skip path, removed on the setup path). Tests: src/gateway/process.test.ts; E2E test/e2e-backup/zzz_backup_restore_skip_setup.txt (opt-in E2E_BACKUP_RESTORE=1; sync → destroy → restore, asserts the receipt + unchanged restored setup state); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, test/e2e-backup/README.md, test/e2e/BACKUP-E2E-DESIGN.md.
  • The dashboard Usage & Billing widget now reflects emitted billable actions. GET /api/admin/costs/v2/summary was a stub returning totalCostUsd: 0; it now aggregates the tenant’s billable-action Analytics Engine rows via the AE SQL API (src/cost-summary.ts → getCostSummary()), returning totalCostUsd, totalCredits, actionCount, byTriggerType, and byCostCategory. Config mirrors Lerma: ANALYTICS_DATASET (default fourai_cost_metrics), ANALYTICS_ENGINE_BASE_URL, and ANALYTICS_ENGINE_API_TOKEN (falls back to CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN; needs Account Analytics:Read). A missing credential/transport error/non-200 degrades to an all-zero summary, so the widget never breaks. The widget surfaces the billable action/credit rollup when data is present. Tests: src/cost-summary.test.ts, src/routes/api/costs.test.ts, src/client/pages/__tests__/HomePage.test.tsx, src/client/pages/__tests__/AccountPage.test.tsx, test/ui/billing-widget.spec.ts; corpus test/business-rules/dashboard-api-contract.txt; docs apps/fouria/docs/cost-observability.md, docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, docs/TESTING.md.
  • The version surfaces now report the Worker’s own build identity. GET /api/admin/version and GET /debug/version return fouria_version (component CalVer from apps/fouria/package.json) and fouria_commit (short git SHA) alongside the container’s OpenClaw/Node versions; the DiagnosticDashboard Version Info tool surfaces them. Both values are injected at build time by vite.config.ts (__FOURIA_VERSION__ / __FOURIA_COMMIT__, consumed via src/build-info.ts; GITHUB_SHA wins in CI, git rev-parse --short HEAD locally). Tests: src/routes/debug.test.ts, src/routes/api/misc.test.ts; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Expected CLI non-zero exits are no longer logged as failures. waitForProcess (like runShell) now takes reportNonZeroExit; the knowledge wiki status probe sets it false (operation knowledge.wiki-status) because openclaw wiki status exits non-zero for an uninitialized vault — which /api/admin/knowledge/tree handles as a normal initialized: false result — yet every load emitted Error [SandboxProcessError]: sandbox.waitForProcess failed (non-zero-exit, exit=1). Timeouts still log. Tests: src/gateway/utils.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • The prelaunch gateway port probe no longer logs a false failure. isGatewayPortOpen ran curl -sf …/health through runShell, whose logCommandFailure emitted a structured sandbox.process.failed error for the expected closed-port exit (curl 7 = connection refused). Every cold start therefore surfaced a scary Error [SandboxProcessError]: shell failed (non-zero-exit, exit=7) for the normal “gateway down, start it” outcome. It now passes reportNonZeroExit: false with operation: 'gateway.port-probe' (matching the existing gateway.health-probe), so a closed port is quiet while a probe timeout (a hung gateway) still logs. Test: src/gateway/process.test.ts (does not log a structured failure for the expected closed-port exit); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • OpenClaw is installed globally with bun, not npm. bun install --global --trust openclaw runs with BUN_INSTALL=/usr/local: bun’s default global prefix is $HOME/.bun/bin, which is not on PATH in this image, so BUN_INSTALL=/usr/local puts the binary at /usr/local/bin/openclaw (on PATH) and the package under /usr/local/install/global/node_modules/openclaw. bun pm cache rm resolves the current project and hard-fails without a package.json — the base image’s WORKDIR /container-server has none — so it runs from /tmp (which holds the copied repo package.json). The dead-weight trim now targets bun’s hoisted global layout (<prefix>/install/global/node_modules), and start-openclaw.sh resolves the package by following the installed binary (command -v openclaw + readlink -f) instead of npm root -g, so the runtime-version log stays accurate.
  • post-start no longer blocks readiness. After the port wait succeeds the gateway is already serving /health 200, but ensureGatewayImpl still awaited start-openclaw.sh post-start (dev automation + boot-log reset, bounded by GATEWAY_POST_START_TIMEOUT_MS = 60s). On dev instances that phase runs openclaw automations list/create (30–60s), so every request logged Gateway start already in progress … (phase=post-start) and waited on the shared start promise even though the gateway was up. It is now dispatched detached (void runGatewayPostStart(...), not awaited) right after markGatewayReady; startShell dispatches the sandbox.exec synchronously before its first await, so the work still runs server-side if the isolate is evicted, and runGatewayPostStart swallows its own errors. The post-start phase is no longer set on the start tracker (the start is complete). Test: src/gateway/process.test.ts (does not extend the shared start promise with the detached post-start phase); docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • ClawHub plugin pre-install is best-effort so the image still builds. The unpinned clawhub:@openclaw/cloudflare-ai-gateway-provider resolved to 2026.9.9, which requires a newer plugin API than the pinned 2026.9.8 runtime, so openclaw plugins install failed and aborted the whole Docker build (Plugin … requires plugin API >=2026.9.9, but this OpenClaw runtime exposes 2026.9.8). The Dockerfile now wraps each pre-install in a warn-and-continue guard, and start-openclaw.sh’s single enablement config patch only enables a plugin whose extension directory is present (CF_AI_GATEWAY_PLUGIN_PRESENT / UNIFIED_BILLING_PLUGIN_PRESENT), so a failed install can neither fail the build nor invalidate the patch. Root-cause follow-up: bump catalog.openclaw to the plugin-compatible release (openclaw-migration skill) or pin the specs; until then a build on the pinned runtime ships without the Cloudflare provider plugins. Corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/OPENCLAW-PLUGINS.md.
  • Gateway start watchdog + process-count hygiene. A cold start is one shared ensureGateway promise (restore → supervised start-openclaw.sh start → port wait); a wrapper that never execs the gateway, or a control-channel drop, left it “in progress” for ~20 min while every request logged Gateway start already in progress … waiting... and waited on it (observed on tenant-client-dev: 64 processes, port closed, curl health probes exiting 7 every ~5s, [PROXY] Failed to start gateway stack-only). The start is now tracked per sandbox key with a phase (probe → restore → launch → port-wait; post-start runs detached after readiness, not tracked) and a per-phase budget; isGatewayStartStuck trips when a phase overruns its budget + GATEWAY_START_STUCK_GRACE_MS. Before resetting port-wait, recoverStuckGatewayStart rechecks /health: a late-positive response emits gateway.start.late-ready and is adopted without killing, while a failed/unknown recheck emits gateway.start.health-recheck-failed and defers reset. Confirmed stuck starts emit gateway.start.stuck, kill the process (killGateway), clear startup/readiness caches, and reprovision after GATEWAY_START_STUCK_MAX_ATTEMPTS resets (recoverStaleSandbox). findExistingGatewayProcess also uses the pure classifyGatewayStart to kill a start-openclaw.sh start wrapper older than STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS with the port closed, instead of waiting out another readiness budget. Because listProcesses() includes exited/error entries the Worker never GCs (the SDK exposes no cleanup), the raw count is append-only and must not gate health: the log now reads listProcesses returned <total> processes (<running> running) and every decision considers only running entries. Emits gateway.start.begin/phase/stuck/late-ready/health-recheck-failed. Tests: src/gateway/classify.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Legacy bridge excludes the image-provided shared OpenClaw package. extensions/<id>/node_modules/openclaw is a symlink to the image’s /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw; archiving it is pointless and (when an old dereferencing stage expanded it into a full package copy) made the restore materialization a multi-minute copy that blocked the gateway launch, left restore-needed set, and re-ran the restore on every boot (observed on staging-client-dev: cp -a … /root/openclaw/.openclaw/ running 8m45s, 65 Worker probe processes, no start-openclaw.sh/gateway). Both stageLegacyRootsForBackup and materializeLegacyRootsAfterRestore now use a symlink-preserving tar pipe with --exclude='*/node_modules/openclaw' (a copy-then-rm -rf is equally slow — deleting a squashfs-lower tree requires copy-up), so old and new archives restore fast. restoreIfNeeded also deletes the restore-needed marker immediately after a successful materialization (before the analytics bookkeeping) so an isolate eviction can no longer leave a stale marker. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt.
  • Legacy restore bridge preserves symlinks (backup/restore fix). The legacy state bridge staged /root/openclaw/.openclaw with cp -aL, which dereferenced the plugin extensions/*/node_modules/openclaw symlinks (→ /usr/local/lib/node_modules/openclaw) into full OpenClaw package copies. That bloated every archive (the package three times over), timed out the pre-snapshot stage (600s) — surfacing to the dashboard as a backup-create Internal Server Error — and made restore fail because cp cannot overwrite the image’s symlink with a directory (cp: cannot overwrite non-directory … with directory), leaving the tenant looping on a failed restore (staging-client-dev). The stage and the restore materialization now use cp -a (preserve symlinks); the restore additionally removes any destination symlink the stage replaces with a real directory first, so backups created by the old dereferencing stage still restore. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt. Also: the admin API client (src/client/api.ts) now reads the response body once and surfaces a plain-text platform error (e.g. Internal Server Error) instead of throwing Unexpected token 'I', "Internal S"... is not valid JSON; tests src/client/api.test.ts.
  • Recurring-error hardening: credential redaction, bounded-RPC cleanup, live-gateway logs, and idempotent WS teardown. Investigation of the recurring ReadableStream received over RPC disconnected prematurely / [WS] Client error telemetry found four concrete causes. (1) Credential logging: the catch-all proxy logged the full forwarded header map (Object.fromEntries(httpHeaders.entries())), writing CF Access JWT/assertions, cookies, and the tenant metadata blob to Workers Logs; it now logs only an allowlisted subset (safeHeaderLog, src/utils/logging.ts). (2) Late container RPCs: a bounded containerFetch/wsConnect whose timeout won could still settle later with a live body/socket that was never drained/closed; withTimeoutAndCleanup (src/utils/timeout.ts) plus containerFetchWithTimeout/wsConnectWithTimeout (src/utils/container-rpc.ts) cancel the late body / close the late socket, applied to the public proxy, diagnostics, and the gateway-api probes. (3) Live gateway logs: a running gateway’s SDK log stream never settles, so reading it opened an RPC stream that was later disconnected; a running GatewayProcess.getLogs() now tails /tmp/gateway-stdout.log, and /debug/processes?logs=true / /api/admin/logs?id= refuse a live stream for a still-running process. (4) WS teardown: both peer close handlers recorded the same session metric twice, and a client tab disconnect was logged at error; a single settleSession() now records the metric once and client disconnects log at warn with the sessionId. Tests: src/utils/container-rpc.test.ts, src/utils/timeout.test.ts, src/logging.test.ts, src/index.test.ts, src/gateway/process.test.ts, src/routes/api/misc.test.ts, src/routes/debug.test.ts; local observability canary test/e2e/ad_observability_canary.txt + test/e2e/fixture/observability-query; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/TESTING.md.
  • Two local-E2E self-skip fixes. provision_and_dispatch’s first scenario (%require) echoed a SKIP: line and exit 1 in local mode, so it failed instead of skipping — and because it is %require, that failure skipped every later scenario in the file. It now emits the same PASS: … (skipped - local E2E mode) line and exit 0 the other local skips in the file use. p_otel_billing_queue asserted emitted >= 1, but a dev-environment/staging-platform instance is non-billable by design (resolveInstanceDimensions, src/routes/otel.ts): the receiver accepts + ignores approved spans (200) and returns billable: false without emitting. The local worker (DEV_MODE=true, no routable WORKER_URL) is always non-billable, so the test now skips on billable == false (like its existing missing-secret/401 skip); the emit path stays asserted by the cloud profile and src/routes/otel-traces.test.ts. Corpus: test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt, test/business-rules/dev-expense.txt; docs docs/TESTING.md.
  • Local E2E readiness gate accepts a reachable-but-starting Worker. fixture/server/start-local waited for /api/health with curl -sf -m 5 (60×2s), but a cold boot legitimately answers 503 while the container/gateway starts (the non-waking-health semantics) and the non-passive probe can block on container provisioning — so the gate misread a live-but-starting Worker as dead. Worse, the non-passive probe on every 2s poll re-triggered restoreIfNeeded/ensureGateway, launching overlapping R2 restores that abort each other with OperationInterruptedError: ... runtime changed. The gate now probes the fast, non-waking GET /api/health?passive=1 and accepts any HTTP status (200/503/…) via the shared e2e_worker_reachable helper (test/lib/e2e-helpers.sh), failing only on a connection failure (status 000); the window is overridable with E2E_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECS (default 120s) and the “local dev server died” check still fails fast. The real gateway wait (startup.ok + readiness.ok) stays in the _setup.txt readiness step. Tests: src/e2e-helpers.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/TESTING.md.
  • Restore failures are logged as structured persistence.restore.failed events with backupId, errorName, and errorMessage; manual route failures also include the Cloudflare Ray ID as storage.restore.failed. This keeps the backup identity searchable and correlates async failures to the originating request. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts, src/routes/api/storage.test.ts.
  • Backup retention is enforced on catalog reads, and restores survive a failed pre-restore umount. Live fouria-backup-tarjetero-dev held 7 archives under maxVersions: 3: every snapshot was killed after sandbox.createBackup() (260 MB) but before its commit, so a later read adopted all 7 as orphans, and every scheduled snapshot after that failed at the legacy stage before its own prune — the cap was only ever applied on the happy snapshot path. reconcileOrphanedBackups now runs cleanupOldBackups after merging, so the invariant holds on every read (getBackupHistory included) and no write/delete happens when the catalog is already within the cap. Restores failed in a loop on [persistence] Restore of … failed: … runShell … restoreIfNeeded: the best-effort umount (|| true guards the shell, not the exec RPC) threw a cold-start/platform interruption and aborted the restore before restoreBackup, keeping restore-needed and failing the startup barrier. The umount is now caught + logged in restoreIfNeeded and restoreBackupById; an empty catalog read no longer deletes restore-needed (a transient reconcile list failure silently dropped an operator restore) — the marker clears only after a successful restore. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (over-cap prune, adopted-orphan prune, no-delete within cap, marker retention, umount-failure restore); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md.
  • Async admin backup/restore + non-blocking Backups page. A manual snapshot/restore can wait up to the 120s R2 lease and then transfer a large archive; holding the admin HTTP request open surfaced as a bare 500 after ~132s (restore) with the error dropped. POST /api/admin/storage/sync?async=1 and POST /api/admin/storage/restore/:id?async=1 now acknowledge 202 { accepted: true } and run in executionCtx.waitUntil (default stays synchronous for the E2E checkpoint). BackupsPage paints every section independently and reads the fast GET /api/admin/config/raw instead of the slow structured /api/admin/config (which awaits ensureGateway + up to two 30s shell waits) — so no single request blocks the page. BackupHistoryPanel fires the async endpoints, pushes a “started” bell notification, then polls GET /storage/backups (snapshot) / /api/health (restore) and pushes success/failure via NotificationProvider (survives navigation). Restore failures are reported as structured storage.restore.failed events. Tests: src/routes/api/storage.test.ts, src/client/components/__tests__/BackupHistoryPanel.test.tsx, src/client/pages/__tests__/BackupsPage.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Startup-stream and dashboard polling back-off. /api/startup/ws now drops the 2-exec startup-progress read and backs off to STARTUP_WS_READY_POLL_INTERVAL_MS (30s) once the gateway is ready — the 5s cadence plus a per-push listProcesses/exec probe burst is a large share of the Sandbox DO control-channel churn (Establishing RPC connection) during a boot. useGatewayHealth now stops its HTTP fallback polling when a /api/health/ws snapshot arrives (it previously kept double-polling after the socket recovered). transformErrorMessage maps the gateway’s 1008 device token mismatch close to a “re-open /_admin/ to re-approve this browser” message instead of a reconnect loop. Tests: src/client/hooks/useGatewayHealth.test.tsx; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt.
  • Backup local-bucket mode is decoupled from DEV_MODE. isLocalBucketDevMode() keyed createBackup({ localBucket }) on process.env.DEV_MODE, and with nodejs_compat_populate_process_env the cloud E2E’s DEV_MODE=true var (set only to bypass Access on a bare workers.dev host) made every E2E snapshot land in the Sandbox local binding bucket — invisible to the Worker’s BACKUP_BUCKET HEAD, so restore logged Backup <id> missing from R2 and booted without tenant state. It is now isLocalBucketBackupMode(env): an explicit BACKUP_LOCAL_BUCKET=true opt-in that falls back to DEV_MODE only when unset; the E2E deploy pins BACKUP_LOCAL_BUCKET=false. resolveRestoreEntry threads env through. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (explicit override wins); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md, docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, .dev.vars.example.
  • A dropped port probe no longer spawns a duplicate gateway. When the DO↔container control channel flapped (Network connection lost. on every exec), ensureGatewayImpl’s prelaunch isGatewayPortOpenResilient throw was treated as “gateway absent”, so it re-ran start-openclaw.sh start on each request even though listProcesses matched the gateway running — piling lock contention and RPC load onto the unhealthy channel. A transport-classified probe failure is now “unknown”: the Worker logs Port probe transport drop … and returns without spawning, retrying on the next request. Test: src/gateway/process.test.ts (ensureGateway transport-drop resilience); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt.
  • E2E ac_gateway_startup_concurrency accepts the 503 cold-boot health response. The concurrent non-passive /api/health fan-out used curl -f, which fails on any non-2xx, but /api/health answers 503 while starting (JSON snapshot present) since the non-waking-health change — so a healthy cold boot always reported probes_ok=0. The probes now accept 200/503 with a shaped {startup, readiness} body; the ready-wait and single-owner assertions are unchanged. Docs/corpus updated.
  • Sandbox→R2 bridges resolve the tenant from the per-tenant Worker env, not the fixed sandbox id. The leads.r2.internal and docs.r2.internal bridges (src/sandbox-leads-bridge.ts, src/sandbox-docs-bridge.ts) scoped every path to the caller’s <slug>/ using ctx.containerId, but production provisions the sandbox under the fixed id openclaw (getSandbox(..., 'openclaw') in src/index.ts, src/tasks/index.ts, src/activity/scheduler.ts), so listings resolved to openclaw/ and always returned empty. Added resolveTenantSlug / tenantSlugFromEnv in src/sandbox-tenant.ts: an explicit customer-<slug> container id still wins (legacy multi-tenant), otherwise the slug is derived from the per-tenant Worker env — CUSTOMER_SLUG, WORKER_NAME via deriveCustomerSlug, or the always-provisioned WORKER_URL hostname (strips tenant- / staging- prefixes and the -dev suffix, so tenant-tarjetero-dev / https://tarjetero-dev.fouria.io → tarjetero). Tests: src/sandbox-tenant.test.ts, src/sandbox-leads-bridge.test.ts, src/sandbox-docs-bridge.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/tenant-isolation.txt; docs docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Crash-consistent backup cataloging (issue #344). The scheduled backup control action runs the full snapshot orchestration inside one tenant request and could exceed the Worker CPU budget after sandbox.createBackup() had uploaded backups/<id>/… but before the handle was written — leaving an orphaned snapshot, a missing backup-handle.json (and empty configs/), a live backup-lock, and a dispatch [cron] Failed to trigger backup. createSnapshotUnlocked now commits the catalog entry immediately after the archive is created (after encryption, before the config-version capture and retention prune), and reconcileOrphanedBackups rebuilds entries from backups/*/meta.json on read (getBackupHistory, restoreIfNeeded, scheduleBackupIfNeeded) so pre-existing orphans self-heal and stay restorable. The Dispatch Worker gives the backup action a dedicated CPU budget (BACKUP_CONTROL_CPU_MS) and logs the underlying error on a thrown control fetch. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (commit ordering, config-save failure, reconciliation), workers/fouria-dispatch/test/unit/control.test.ts, cron-fanout.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Transport-resilient backup stage (issue #344 follow-up). The pre-snapshot legacy-stage shell now waits via runShellResilient (→ waitForExitResilient): a transient Sandbox DO↔container transport drop mid-stage reattaches to the process by id and resumes within the stage deadline, instead of ending the /control backup request (observed on staging-client-dev: the stage ran ~5 min then the request ended with a Network connection lost. drop and no Creating backup...). The Dispatch backup CPU budget (BACKUP_CONTROL_CPU_MS) is raised 300s → 600s to match the 10-minute stage bound. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (transport-drop retry); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Legacy-stage backup robustness + diagnosability (issue #344 follow-up). The scheduled backup stage shell (stageLegacyRootsForBackup → runLegacyStageShell) copies /root/openclaw/.openclaw + /root/clawd with cp -aL and runs a node:sqlite online backup; on a large tenant it exceeded the old 300 s bound and killed the backup (tenant-tarjetero, observed at exactly 300 s). LEGACY_STAGE_TIMEOUT_MS is now env-overridable (default 600000 / 10 min), the idempotent stage is retried once on a transient timeout/transport failure, and stage failures log exit/timedOut/stderr plus a structured sandbox.process.failed Worker event with processId and a stable operation label. The process id joins Worker Logs to the Containers dataset without exposing the raw command/output. Tests: src/persistence.test.ts (retry, no-retry, timeout override, error logging); corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/ENV-VARIABLES.md.
  • Sleeping tenants + non-waking health. /api/health now answers 503 unless the gateway is ready, and a passive probe (?passive=1) short-circuits on the non-waking isRuntimeActive() read and reports status: "sleeping" (HTTP 200, healthy-idle) for an idle container instead of running the exec RPCs that auto-start it — so Lerma’s HealthMonitor (which now probes ?passive=1) never wakes a tenant. Non-billable tenants (staging 15m, dev 2h) sleep per a derived idle timeout (the Sandbox SDK 1.0 setInactivityTimeout() platform cap; there is no SANDBOX_SLEEP_AFTER binding; the value comes from the instance hostname via src/dev-mode.ts), and the ActivityScheduler DO alarm wakes/heals ahead of the next automation and runs an interval-gated R2 checkpoint after the wake. Billable production (platform === 'production' && environment === 'production') does not auto-sleep; the container stays awake and is stopped only by an explicit lerma freeze (POST /control → sandbox.destroy()), so a warmed gateway never incurs a cold-start/downtime window after an idle period. Runtime cutover is gated by SANDBOX_RUNTIME (legacy default | v1); SandboxV1 is still scaffold-only, so resolveSandboxRuntime() reports v1 as pending and the legacy class keeps serving (src/sandbox-runtime.ts). Tests: src/routes/public.test.ts, src/gateway/health-probes.test.ts, src/activity/alarm.test.ts, src/sandbox-runtime.test.ts, src/sandbox-do.test.ts, src/build-sandbox-options.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; lerma health_monitor_test.exs, health_poller_test.exs, tenant_provisioner_pipeline_test.exs. See docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Single-owner gateway launch (start-openclaw.sh start): the production cold-start mode acquires the container-wide startup lock before config setup and holds fd 9 through the Gateway exec, so one owner covers setup and launch. The lock is inherited by the gateway process and released exactly when it exits, so only one owner can run — the OpenClaw 2026.9.8 state-DB single-owner migration otherwise caused concurrent launches (from different Worker isolates) to lose the migration, exit before binding the port, and leave the boot forever unhealthy (state.sqlite is undergoing offline maintenance). Losers poll the local /health (bounded) and exit 0 without a duplicate launch, or take over if the owner dies and releases the lock; the log-mirror tail -f closes fd 9 (9>&-) so it cannot hold the lock. The launch mode remains a standalone smoke/manual entry point with its dedicated /tmp/openclaw-gateway-launch.lock; full routes through the same lock in background mode. Regression: the serial test/e2e/ac_gateway_startup_concurrency.txt (phaseD_startup) asserts exactly one owner and the absence of both the migration-input-change error and the SQLite offline-maintenance error. See docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md.
  • Fixed the develop cold-boot stall introduced by #318 (startup.ok=false / readiness.ok=false for the whole E2E readiness budget; 68 processes, start-openclaw.sh setup exited 0, curl /health always exit 7, no openclaw gateway run ever present). Root cause: #318 had split the boot so the Worker launched the gateway after start-openclaw.sh setup exited (supervised exec) — this was the former behavior; current production collapses setup and launch into the atomic start-openclaw.sh start described above (startup lock acquired before setup, held through the Gateway exec). /api/health is bounded to a 5s snapshot, so the request returned long before the ~24s setup finished; when the response was sent, workerd cancelled the unregistered ensureGateway continuation, so the container-side setup completed but the Worker never resumed to launch the gateway. Fix: /api/health (and /api/warmup) now register the in-flight boot with c.executionCtx.waitUntil(ensureGateway(sandbox, env, { waitForReady: true })) so the setup → gateway-launch sequence survives past the response; waitForReady: true returns the shared start promise unwrapped and dedupes onto the one the snapshot already started. Also hardened the RPC-first health probe (getRpcHealthSnapshot, src/gateway/health-probes.ts) to run only once a gateway process is detected — sandbox.containerFetch auto-starts the container and blocks on the closed gateway port during a cold boot, piling port-waits on the Sandbox DO control channel. buildHealthSnapshot (src/routes/public.ts) passes its already-fetched findGatewayProcess result as { proc }. Bisected: production E2E boot green at ad9ad4a5 (#317), red at 9ae5f66c (#318). See apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md §Admin RPC.
  • Startup resilience to Sandbox DO code updates: a Worker/DO redeploy (e.g. a Lerma redeploy of a tenant script) resets the DO↔container control session while the container keeps running, so the supervised waitForPort on the atomic start-openclaw.sh start process rejected with Network connection lost. and the cold start was aborted — killing a gateway that would have completed. The atomic start path has no separate setup-process wait (one supervised process spans config setup through the gateway’s whole life), so only the port wait is transport-resilient: ensureGateway waits with waitForPortResilient (src/gateway/sandbox-exec.ts), which reattaches to the process by id via getProcess(id) and resumes the wait within the shared STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS deadline; only a non-transport error, an un-reattachable process, or an exhausted deadline fails. The generic waitForExitResilient helper remains in sandbox-exec.ts for the legacy/boot-smoke supervised waits. The loading page’s GET /api/startup/ws stream also treats a transport-drop snapshot as transient: it re-sends the last known state (or a synthetic starting view) and backs off exponentially (STARTUP_WS_POLL_INTERVAL_MS → STARTUP_WS_MAX_BACKOFF_MS, 30s) instead of re-probing and re-logging the same error every 5s.
  • Backups run only on running instances; health is observability-only. GET /api/health no longer schedules snapshots (passive or active) — the lerma HealthMonitor is a pure probe and MUST NOT alter the R2 catalog. The Dispatch Worker cron (workers/fouria-dispatch, 15 min prod / hourly staging) fans a backup control action (POST /control, X-FourIA-Control: backup) out to every non-frozen tenant; the tenant asserts sandbox.isRuntimeActive() (a non-waking bridge read) and skips a sleeping container rather than waking it (an idle instance has no workload or filesystem changes, and waking would restart billing), then runs the interval/lock-gated scheduleBackupIfNeeded. POST /debug/reprovision now checkpoints only a live runtime, bounded by REPROVISION_CHECKPOINT_TIMEOUT_MS, verifies restorability by HEADing the newest catalog entries’ meta.json, and fails closed (409) unless a restorable backup exists; {"force":true} overrides for an already-unrecoverable container. Root cause of the empty buckets: the old health-triggered path scheduled a snapshot regardless of readiness.ok, so a booting/stopped container could start sandbox.createBackup(), hang, and leave a stale backup-lock (observed in fouria-backup-tarjetero); dev instances the HealthMonitor does not monitor had no trigger at all. Tests: src/routes/public.test.ts, src/routes/debug.test.ts, src/index.test.ts, workers/fouria-dispatch/test/unit/control.test.ts; corpus test/business-rules/operational-modes.txt; docs docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md, apps/fouria/docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md, docs/CLOUD-ARCHITECTURE.md, workers/fouria-dispatch/README.md. E2E: test/e2e-backup/zz_reprovision_guard.txt + test/e2e-backup/zzz_backup_cold_restore.txt + test/e2e-backup/zzz_backup_semantics.txt (separate test/e2e-backup/ corpus, excluded from the default test/e2e run; run locally with bun run test:e2e:backup; registered in phaseE_restore, reprovision guard first), the dispatch fan-out unit test workers/fouria-dispatch/test/unit/cron-fanout.test.ts, deterministic E2E backup env in test/e2e/fixture/server/deploy, and POST /_control/:slug/backup on the dispatch worker; design in test/e2e/BACKUP-E2E-DESIGN.md. Dispatch note: vitest.config.ts now has unit (node) + integration (workerd) projects so the fan-out logic is testable without Miniflare.
  • PR E2E scope: the e2e job now sets E2E_BOOT_ONLY=1 for pull requests, so run-parallel.sh provisions the worker and only asserts the gateway reaches startup.ok + readiness.ok, then tears down without running any cctr group. develop and a manual workflow_dispatch (new full_tests input, default checked) run the full corpus. See apps/fouria/test/e2e-parallel/run-parallel.sh and docs/TESTING.md.
  • Setup serialization (start-openclaw.sh): start, setup, and full take an exclusive flock on /tmp/openclaw-setup.lock (~900s wait; OPENCLAW_SETUP_LOCK_TIMEOUT override) right after the gateway fast-path, then re-check the fast-path and exit 0 if a concurrent invocation brought the gateway up while they waited. In production, start acquires this lock before the setup body and holds it through the Gateway exec, so one owner serializes setup and launch. The Worker’s gatewayStartPromises guard is per-isolate, so an E2E cold-start burst lands several runs in different isolates at once; without the lock they ran the slow setup body concurrently, contended on OpenClaw’s native config/state locks, and stalled cold start for ~18 min (run 36692775633 — [SandboxRecovery] never fired because the admission-failure streak is also per-isolate). full releases fd 9 before backgrounding the gateway so the child does not inherit the lock; post-start is outside it. Degrades to the previous unserialized behaviour when flock is absent.
  • Native supervised gateway launch (src/gateway/process.ts): the Worker’s production cold start is one atomic supervised sandbox.exec of start-openclaw.sh start, which acquires the container-wide startup lock before the setup body (R2 restore → onboard → plugin installs → moltlazy patch) and holds it through the gateway exec — /bin/bash -lc 'touch /tmp/gateway-stdout.log; pgrep … || ( tail -f … & ); exec openclaw gateway run … >> /tmp/gateway-stdout.log 2>&1' — instead of the script backgrounding it with &. exec replaces the bash wrapper so the supervised process is the gateway (listProcesses/getProcess track it for the life of the container; kill() targets it directly); the guarded tail starts the container-stdout log mirror as a sibling (safe because the Worker never waitForExits on the gateway handle), and the redirect preserves the ops-readable log file. After the port is ready the Worker dispatches start-openclaw.sh post-start (dev automation + boot-log reset, best-effort) detached (void, not awaited) on every cold start — the gateway is already serving, so post-start must not extend the shared start promise (dev instances run openclaw automations list/create there, 30–60s, and awaiting it left every request logging Gateway start already in progress … waiting... while /health already returned 200); because it is dispatched unconditionally, a /api/health-triggered boot (waitForReady:false) still creates the dev automation even though its caller returned early. start-openclaw.sh gains setup/post-start modes; the default full mode keeps the legacy background launch for manual runs and test:gateway:boot. A shared STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS deadline bounds setup + port wait; launchWithRecovery centralizes the stale/orphan/transport retry policy shared by both phases. The setup/post-start phases must stay child-free: the SDK’s waitForExit only settles once the supervised terminal exits, which never happens while the script leaves a live background child (a tail -f log mirror or a background cloudflared there stalled every cold start for the full STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS, re-running setup until the ~11-minute mark). The mirror is started by the native launch; cloudflared is detached with setsid. Never call output()/runShell on the live gateway handle (it never exits): read diagnostics from the /tmp/gateway-stdout.log / /tmp/startup.log tails instead (readLogTail).
  • All three ClawHub plugins (cloudflare-ai-gateway provider, diagnostics-otel, cloudflare-unified-billing) are pre-installed into the container image at Docker build time (unpinned → latest ClawHub release; capability consent recorded in the image). This moves the per-boot network installs off the latency-critical startup path: start-openclaw.sh detects them via the extension dir + plugins list and only falls back to a ClawHub install when that state is missing (e.g. a warm R2 restore replaced it). The Dockerfile does not copy the Paso4 plugin source — it downloads the published ClawHub artifact — so the image stays source-free. The plugin’s source and tests now live in Paso4/openclaw-plugins (removed from this repo); see docs/OPENCLAW-PLUGINS.md. Runtime enablement is written by a single working config patch that also enables admin-http-rpc and disables diagnostics-otel unless its endpoint is set (the patch must not carry plugins.bundledDiscovery — removed in 2026.9.x, it fails validation and drops the whole patch — nor plugins.allow, which disables every bundled provider not listed). Memory search is disabled via the top-level memory.search.enabled=false (the old agents.defaults.memorySearch key is gone in 2026.9.x). Measured local cold boot: 35s vs 56s before
  • Gateway restart split: POST /api/admin/gateway/restart is the soft reload — sends SIGUSR2 to the live openclaw gateway run process (in-process, no connection drop, no port rebind) via softReloadGateway and falls back to signalRestoreNeeded only when no live gateway is found; POST /debug/restart-openclaw (DEBUG_ROUTES=true, ROOT) is the hard restart — killGateway + resetStartupCache + signalRestoreNeeded + start-openclaw.sh reprovision (in-place, no startGatewayDirect) so existing client tokens keep working. SIGUSR1 is not a restart signal (it opens Node’s inspector on 127.0.0.1:9229); the E2E n_gateway_soft_reload.txt asserts the inspector stays closed after a soft reload. The reload targets the server, not the openclaw gateway run launcher: buildSoftReloadScript signals the exact comm (pgrep -x 'openclaw-gatewa', Linux 15-char truncation, plus a defensive openclaw-gateway), because signalling the launcher kills it and orphans the server without restarting it (readiness never dips while the endpoint still reports reloaded: true). The E2E therefore requires both a stable /api/status.processId and an increased http server listening count, since processId alone survives a broken reload. Issue #463: OPENCLAW_NO_RESPAWN stays — removing it cannot enable process-level restarts inside a container (see the decision record in docs/plans/sandbox-memory-usage.md)
  • OPENCLAW_NO_RESPAWN=1 is set in the Dockerfile as explicit intent only: inside a container OpenClaw already resolves restart mode to in-process (isContainerEnvironment() → disabled / unmanaged), so removing the flag cannot enable process-level restarts or reclaim memory (#463); softReloadGateway only signals live processes and skips zombies
  • Sandbox SDK 1.0 preview (@cloudflare/sandbox@0.13.0-next.776.1 + cloudflare/sandbox:0.13.0-next.776.1 image): startProcess/execStream/getLogs() and SANDBOX_TRANSPORT are gone. All command execution goes through sandbox.exec(argv) (which resolves on launch, not completion); src/gateway/sandbox-exec.ts centralizes the shapes (startShell for a handle, runShell for buffered output, outputOf, collectLogs). listProcesses() now returns ProcessStatus[] (.state, argv .command) and a live handle is fetched via getProcess(id); findExistingGatewayProcess returns a GatewayProcess wrapper. waitForProcess delegates to waitForExit({timeout}) and kills on timeout. SandboxOptions.labels was removed upstream. Deploy cutover requires wrangler deploy --containers-rollout=immediate (stable/1.0 control protocols are incompatible)
  • Stale sandbox recovery (src/gateway/sandbox-recovery.ts): when the platform terminates the container behind a live Sandbox DO, every RPC fails with sandbox.exec error … HTTP error! status: 500 — isStaleContainerError classifies these and recoverStaleSandbox destroys the dead instance + resets startup/persistence caches so the next RPC auto-provisions a fresh container; wired into findExistingGatewayProcess, checkGatewayHealth and the ensureGateway startShell retry; cooldown-guarded (60s), never fires for deploy OperationInterruptedError or transient provisioning errors. It also matches the control-protocol mismatch ('utils.getRuntimeMetadata' is not a function, activateControlSession, RuntimeControlProtocolError) seen during a deploy cutover while the still-running container predates the new SDK’s control handshake — the SDK logs a sandbox.exec error … line but re-throws the bare TypeError, so the message patterns are matched directly and the stale instance is reprovisioned instead of failing until the platform rollout replaces it
  • Orphaned-instance recovery (src/gateway/sandbox-recovery.ts): a container destroyed out-of-band (Cloudflare Containers dashboard “Destroy”, failed force-stop) leaves the DO alive pointing at a dead placement and surfaces the SDK’s retryable admission errors (no container instance available, max container instances exceeded) instead of the 500 signature. isContainerUnavailableError + trackProvisioningFailure escalate to a recovery only once the streak reaches ORPHANED_INSTANCE_MIN_FAILURES and spans ORPHANED_INSTANCE_GRACE_MS (120s, > the SDK’s ≈110s provisioning budget, so slow-but-healthy cold starts are never cancelled); maybeRecoverSandbox unifies both failure classes and clears the streak whenever a sandbox RPC succeeds. Operator lever: POST /debug/reprovision (DEBUG_ROUTES, ROOT) destroys the instance + clears caches + resets the streak without touching the gateway, so it works when the container is entirely gone
  • Activity-driven wake (src/activity/): automations run inside the Gateway, so it must be running for schedules to fire. A per-tenant ActivityScheduler Durable Object (binding ACTIVITY, SQLite-backed, separate from the SDK Sandbox DO whose alarm drives sleepAfter) mirrors the tenant’s schedule (openclaw automations list --json, refreshed on warm /api/health when readiness.ok, throttled to 5 min) and arms one alarm CRON_WAKE_AHEAD_MINUTES (default 10) before the next enabled job. On fire it wakes + heals via ensureGateway (recovering an orphaned instance) then re-arms; no enabled jobs → alarm cleared → container sleeps. Healing/wakeup is independent of user traffic, gated on job activity, and free when idle (src/activity/alarm.ts state machine is unit-tested; the DO is a thin adapter). Requires the ACTIVITY binding in wrangler.jsonc + lerma (tenant_provisioner.ex resource_bindings, dispatch_namespace.ex @do_sqlite_classes)
  • Container image build profiles: the Dockerfile takes a BUILD_PROFILE build arg (default production → slim, only xz-utils; dev → adds the optional pandoc + weasyprint PDF/document stack, ~760 MB, used by the dev-only Fouria Builder fouria-leads skill). The profile is selected per wrangler environment via image_vars (equivalent to docker build --build-arg): env.staging (dev/test) sets dev; env.production and the default/local config keep the slim default. The release CD builds the slim default, and the E2E basic (PR) and production (develop) profiles both provision the slim production image on the same standard-2 instance (differ by env only)
  • Sandbox → leads R2 bridge (src/sandbox-leads-bridge.ts, leads.r2.internal): the fouria-leads skill now reaches the global paso4-leads bucket through the Sandbox outboundByHost bridge (plain HTTP resolved in the Workers runtime with the LEADS_BUCKET binding — no R2 creds in the container, no public route) instead of the public wss://<worker>/api/leads/ws proxy. The proxy is intercepted by Cloudflare Access on tenant hostnames (a per-tenant Access app shadows the *.fouria.io/<path> apps — confirmed via the login redirect’s kid) and is retained only for the host-side E2E fixture. Related: lerma’s HealthMonitor now probes with redirect: false, so a shadowed /api/health 302 (Access login page) is surfaced instead of being followed and misreported as healthy
  • Client docs hardening + operations (dev-only): tenant-isolated the leads.r2.internal bridge (src/sandbox-leads-bridge.ts resolves the caller slug via the shared src/sandbox-tenant.ts resolver and treats every agent path as relative to <slug>/, so a sandboxed agent can only reach its own proposal; the shared build-pdf.sh stays read-only). Added the Admin Client Docs page (/_admin/docs, ADMIN, dev-only) + the extended src/routes/api/fouria-docs.ts managing docs (customers/<slug>/docs/) and leads directly from the Worker (no CLI) with markdown rendering (marked + DOMPurify), native-browser PDF opening via /raw, and multipart uploads; HTML/SVG raw downloads are forced to attachment + sandbox CSP. Added Worker-side git-like versioning (DocsGitStore: content-addressed blobs/commits/refs, GET /commits, POST /rollback/:sha as a non-destructive revert) and backups (DocsBackupStore: POST /backup, GET /backups, POST /backups/:id/restore, retention 10). See docs/WORKER-DEVELOPMENT.md §“Client Docs (dev-only admin surface)”
  • ECONNRESET from the sandbox R2 bridges fixed: the tenant’s LEADS_BUCKET was provisioned as a plain-text var (the bucket name) instead of an r2_bucket binding, so env.LEADS_BUCKET was a string, bucket.list() threw inside the outboundByHost handler, and the escaping exception surfaced to the container as an opaque ECONNRESET. Two fixes: (1) the bridges (leads/docs/releases) now validate the binding with isR2Bucket (src/r2-binding.ts) and wrap their bodies in try/catch, returning a structured JSON 503/500 instead of resetting the socket; (2) lerma (instances.ex instance_bindings/2, config LEADS_R2_BUCKET default paso4-leads) now provisions LEADS_BUCKET as an r2_bucket binding on every tenant worker (redeploy existing tenants to replace the stray var)
  • Admin RPC-first read path (src/gateway/admin-rpc.ts): the hot dashboard reads/writes now go through OpenClaw’s bundled admin-http-rpc plugin (POST /api/v1/admin/rpc) over sandbox.containerFetch, reusing the typed moltlazy/sdk HTTP RpcClient (which gained an injectable fetcher). This removes the ~10–15s per-call CLI spawn/WS-reconnect on GET /api/admin/devices, POST .../approve, GET /api/admin/models, and GET /api/admin/channels/probe (measured locally: ~1.3–2.5s CLI → ~30–40ms RPC), each of which keeps its CLI path as a fallback (createAdminRpcClient returns null / throws → existing parser runs). start-openclaw.sh enables the plugin with a dedicated plugins.entries["admin-http-rpc"].enabled=true patch — NOT plugins.allow, which disables every bundled provider not listed (and the nearby batched plugin patch is rejected upstream for the removed plugins.bundledDiscovery key). src/index.ts shadows /api/v1/admin/rpc with a 404 before the public catch-all proxy so the operator surface stays container-local. The home-grown moltlazy/sdk WebSocket client is intentionally not used for admin RPC
  • Gateway WebSocket RPC (src/gateway/gateway-rpc.ts): methods outside the admin-http-rpc allowlist (notably audit.activity.list) are reached with OpenClaw’s official @openclaw/gateway-client/browser reference client + @openclaw/gateway-protocol types, bridged over sandbox.wsConnect and authenticated with the shared gateway token as an operator. The wire-v4 handshake (connect.challenge → connect → hello-ok) is owned by the official client; the connect frame’s client.version comes from __OPENCLAW_VERSION__, injected by vite.config.ts from catalog.openclaw. RPC-first with CLI fallback: GET /api/admin/audit-logs (audit.activity.list) and the agent board (agents.create/agents.delete/agents.update, model via config.patch). GET /api/admin/integrations is deliberately WebSocket-free (the gateway drops these sockets): channels/agents over the admin HTTP RPC, plugin enabled-state from config.get, toggles/config via config.patch, secrets reload via the CLI. theme, agent bindings, secrets.apply, and channels list --all have no RPC method and stay on the CLI. The two packages are pinned in catalog.@openclaw/gateway-client / catalog.@openclaw/gateway-protocol and must track catalog.openclaw
  • Realtime device-pairing notifications (src/gateway/gateway-rpc.ts openGatewayEventStream, src/routes/api/devices.ts GET /ws): the dashboard NotificationBell now subscribes to GET /api/admin/devices/ws, which pushes an initial { pending, paired } snapshot then relays Gateway device.pair.* events (reconnecting via the official gateway client over sandbox.wsConnect). Admins approve/reject pending devices inline from the bell via POST /api/admin/devices/:requestId/approve / .../reject (RPC-first; the reject route was added). Also fixed secrets apply invocations (integrations/dreaming): current OpenClaw removed --yes (only --from, --dry-run, --allow-exec, --json)
  • CLI→RPC sweep (finishing the RPC-first migration): config set/unset use config.patch; dreaming config writes use config.patch (shared patchConfigViaRpc in src/routes/api/shared.ts); secrets.reload uses the WS secrets.reload; and resolveAgentFlag (used by models/knowledge) resolves the roster via agents.list instead of openclaw agents list. CLI fallbacks are retained everywhere. Remaining CLI-only paths have no Gateway RPC method: secrets apply/audit, openclaw wiki *, agent bind/unbind/bindings, and openclaw --version

Release notes for the fouria tenant Worker. Entries are generated by scripts/release.mjs from the conventional commits that touched apps/fouria since the previous CalVer tag.